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Abstract 
 
The aim of this research was to explore the interaction between governance and 
development in post-colonial Africa. The departure point of the thesis was the 
understanding that the state remains a pre-eminent actor in the international system. 
Keeping this assumption in mind, the study made use of a comparative analysis; 
comparing governance and development in Botswana with governance and 
development in Zaire/the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), focusing on the 
post-colonial era. The importance of this research lies in its contribution to the debate 
on the role of the state in post-colonial Africa. It explores the influence of institution 
formation and policy implementation by governments (in other words, governance) on 
development. Understanding the effect of governance on development can have 
invaluable lessons for other African states in their efforts to develop further. The 
research question, which guided the thesis thus, was: in the era of the pre-eminence of 
the state, making use of a comparison between Botswana and Zaire/DRC, what is the 
influence and effect, of state institution formation and policy implementation 
(governance) by governments, on state development in terms of economical-, 
political- and social development? 
 
The two main variables were governance and development. Development was sub-
divided into three indicators: political, economic and social development. Governance 
was evaluated in terms of being seen as poor or good governance, as per the World 
Bank’s definition and understanding of governance. Zaire/DRC, as an example of a 
failed state, was analysed first, followed by Botswana, selected for its arguably “best 
practice” experience. For each country the analysis was subdivided into three phases 
as per the theoretical framework of Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and 
Stedman’s book, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (1999). Their book 
describes three stages of change in African state development in the post-colonial era 
(Chazan-framework). This framework uses the Chazan-framework and thus 
subdivides the post-colonial era into: the concentration (centralisation) phase, the 
elaboration phase, and finally the reconsideration of state power phase. 
 
The research found that Zaire/DRC followed a process of state collapse in the post-
colonial era, whereas in sharp contrast Botswana experienced positive state 
development. Since independence Zaire continuously practised poor governance 
whilst Botswana largely practiced good governance. This was true in all three phases 
of the Chazan-framework. At the same time, or perhaps due to poor governance, Zaire 
continuously experienced negative development in all three development categories 
whilst Botswana continuously experienced positive development in all three 
development categories, again perhaps due to good governance.  
 
The research concludes that even though Botswana is not necessarily an example of a 
perfect state, it is special in an African context, because of its good governance 
record. This study does not draw direct relationships between good governance and 
development, but finds that Botswana probably benefited greatly in development due 
to the implementation of good institutions, good government policies and general 
good governance. The research also found that states benefit when their governments 
practice and adopt policies that are anti-corruption, pro-democracy, pro-competition, 
pro public-private partnerships, and pro market-orientated economics. In addition, the 
following are also conducive to good governance: leadership with integrity, peaceful 
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and regular leadership changes, clear distinction between government (party) and the 
state, and empowered government oversight institutions that act, even against the 
government itself when needed. The practice of good governance is thus shown to be 
supportive of long-term development. 
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Opsomming 
 
Die doel van hierdie navorsing was om die interaksie tussen regering en ontwikkeling 
in post-koloniale Afrika te ondersoek. Die tesis gaan uit vanuit die oogpunt dat die 
staat steeds ‘n dominante akteur in die internasionale stelsel is. Die studie het gebruik 
gemaak van ‘n vergelykende ontleding. Regeringstyl en ontwikkeling in post-
koloniale Afrika is met mekaar vergelyk. Die vergelyking is getrek tussen Botswana 
en Zaïre/Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo (DRK). Die belangrikheid van die 
navorsing lê in die bydrae tot die debat oor die rol van die staat in Afrika in die post-
koloniale era. Dit bekyk die belangrikheid van instellingskepping en beleids-
implementering (met ander woorde, regeerstyl of regering) deur regerings in terme 
van invloed op die ontwikkeling van state in Afrika. Beter begrip van hierdie 
verhouding kan waardevolle lesse bevat vir ander Afrikastate in hul pogings om 
verder te ontwikkel. Die navorsingsvraag wat die tesis gelei het was dus: in die era 
van die voorrang van die staat, en deur gebruikmaking van ‘n vergelykende studie 
tussen Botswana en Zaïre/DRK, wat is die invloed en effek van staatsinstelling-
vorming en van beleids-implementering (regering) deur regerings, op 
staatsontwikkeling in terme van ekonomiese-, politieke- en sosiale ontwikkeling? 
 
In hierdie studie was regering en ontwikkeling die twee belangrikste veranderlikes 
gewees. Ontwikkeling is onderverdeel in drie aanwysers: politieke, ekonomiese en 
maatskaplike ontwikkeling. Regering is geëvalueer in terme van wat gesien word as 
swak of goeie regering, volgens die Wêreldbank se definisie en begrip van goeie 
regering. Zaïre/DRK is eerste as ‘n voorbeeld van 'n mislukte staat ontleed, gevolg 
deur Botswana, gekies vir sy veronderstelde "beste praktyk"-ervaring. Die analise vir 
elk van hierdie lande is onderverdeel in drie fases, soos gebaseer op die teoretiese 
raamwerk van Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, en Stedman in, Politics and 
Society in Contemporary Africa (1999) (die Chazan-raamwerk). Hierdie raamwerk 
onderverdeel die post-koloniale era in: die konsentrasiefase (sentraliseringsfase), die 
uitbreidingsfase en uiteindelik die fase van die heroorweging van staatsmag. 
 
Die navorsing bevind dat Zaïre 'n proses van ineenstorting van die staat in die post-
koloniale era ervaar het, terwyl Botswana in skrille kontras positiewe 
staatsontwikkeling ervaar het. Hierdie tendens was aanwesig in al drie fases van die 
Chazan-raamwerk. Sedert onafhanklikheid het Botswana ook goeie regering toegepas 
terwyl Zaïre/DRK meestal swak regering toegepas het. Terselfdertyd, dalk ook weens 
swak regering, het Zaïre/DRK voortdurend negatiewe ontwikkeling ervaar in al drie 
van die ontwikkelings kategorieë, terwyl Botswana voortdurend, moontlik te danke 
goeie regering, positiewe ontwikkeling in al drie die ontwikkelingskategorieë ervaar 
het.  
 
Die navorsing kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat, selfs al is Botswana nie noodwendig ‘n 
voorbeeld van 'n perfekte staat nie, dit steeds weens ‘n goeie regeringstradisie, uniek 
is in Afrika-konteks. Alhoewel hierdie studie nie 'n direkte verhouding tussen goeie 
regering en ontwikkeling probeer bevestig het nie, bevind dit wel dat Botswana  
moontlik in terme van ontwikkeling, weens die implementering van goeie instellings, 
goeie regeringsbeleid en algemene goeie regering, baie voordeel getrek het. Die 
navorsing bevind ook dat state voordeel trek wanneer hul regerings beleid aanvaar en 
toepas wat teen korrupsie is, maar wat demokratiese ideale, markkompetisie, 
openbare-private vennootskappe en markgeoriënteerde ekonomiese aktiwiteite 
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bevorder. Goeie regering word ook bevorder deur leierskap met integriteit, vreedsame 
en gereelde verandering van leierskap, duidelike onderskeid tussen die regering 
(party) en die staat, sowel as nie-regeringsinstellings met die mag om as 
oorsigliggame oor die regering te funksioneer. Die praktyk van goeie regering blyk 
dus langtermyn staatsontwikkeling te bevoordeel en te ondersteun. 
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Chapter 1: Research Design 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
It is often said that the state is a foreign concept to Africa, a continent made up of 
tribes and ethnic groups, arguably not suitable for state formation (Herbst, 2000:13; 
Mazrui, 1986:67;). However, there was a time in history where state structures in 
Africa developed out of own accord. States are not as foreign to Africa as many 
presume. In the time of the Egyptian empire, it was an African state that led the world 
in the spheres of economics, technology and ideology (Allen, 1997:135-137; Mazrui, 
1986:68). There are other examples apart from Egypt; in Eastern Africa there 
developed Swahili city states and in Western Africa the Mali and Songhai empires 
rose to prominence (Arhin, 1967:65, 6; Dixon, 1964:121;). In modern history 
however, Africa has long been on the periphery of the international system, falling 
easy prey to colonial powers and other external influences, but also suffering from 
struggles within. 
 
Some argue that it is the incapacity of the state or even the lack of relevance of the 
state in Africa that is responsible for this African situation. For this reason, the post-
colonial Berlinist
1
 state has been the topic of many academic discussions and debates 
(Kieh, 2007a:3). Even though there is general agreement that the state has some role 
to play in the development of a country, ideas on how a government should mobilise 
the power of the state vary widely (Bremmer, 2009). This paper will begin by looking 
at the literature on states and state development, focusing on the state in Africa. The 
study will take the form of a comparative study, contrasting the experience in state 
development of Zaire/the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
2
 with that of 
Botswana. A comparison between the DRC and Botswana makes a very interesting 
contrast due to Botswana arguably being a case of ‘best practice’ and the Zaire largely 
                                                 
1
 The Berlinist state refers to the colonially imposed state (Kieh, 2007a:7). The name derives from that 
of a conference, the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, in which the major colonial powers decided on 
the rules for the partitioning of Africa (Griffiths, 1986:204). The Berlinist state is a state benefiting the 
political and politically connected elites removed from society and societal needs (Kieh, 2007a:7). 
2
 The Democratic Republic of the Congo was known as Zaire after its independence from Belgium in 
1960. With the fall of Mobutu in 1997, Laurent Kabila renamed Zaire to the République Démocratique 
du Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo). Between 1885-1908 it had been called the Congo Free 
State and between 1908-1960 it was called the Belgian Congo (also referred to as Congo or the Congo) 
(Clark, 1998:109; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 13). 
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being seen as a failed state , as will be shown in the literature review. The purpose of 
this comparison is to try and account for the successes experienced by Botswana as 
well as to try and explain Zaire/DRC’s failures. 
 
1.2 Preliminary Study and Rationale 
1.2.1 Literature Review 
The literature review is divided into three sections. The first section looks at theories 
and ideas on the state, state development, and good governance in an African context. 
The second part of the literature review shifts the focus to research on the case studies 
of Botswana and Zaire and their experiences of the state. Much has been written on 
the state and state development in Africa from pre-colonial, to colonial to post-
colonial times. This study will focus on post-colonial state development. It should be 
noted that state development is different from state building; development is the 
evolving of an existing structure whilst building would be the creation of a structure. 
 
State development can be either seen as the development of the state or it can be seen 
as the state facilitating development. State development, the former, refers to growth 
of the state in terms of growing legitimacy. It is the increase in the state’s ability to 
project power, but also the acceptance of the society governed by the state of the 
state’s authority (Thomson, 2004:15). Legitimacy of a state is strong when the state 
does not have to use coercion to be obeyed. The opposite shows state weakness 
(Thomson, 2004:107). The second form of state development is the growth of a state 
in political, social and economic spheres. In Africa economic development often 
means the growth of structurally weak and dependent economies, forming them into 
independent creators of prosperity. Social development is the growth and 
development of society, the increase of quality of life. Political development is the 
strengthening and creation of free political institutions (Thomson, 2004:16, 20, 22).  
 
It is widely accepted today that political governance influences development in a 
state. In all, “good governance”, is said to influence development positively (Ikome, 
2007:148). Good governance is seen to be the manner of ruling a state in such a way 
as to create strong, open and equal political institutions. It is creating security in a 
state, the delivery of services, the absence of corruption and the upholding and 
strengthening of checks and balances on power (Ikome, 2007:147-148). Ikome 
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continues stating that good governance is to allow the strengthening of civil society, 
increasing respect for human rights, the creation of press freedoms and the general 
empowering of the voiceless (Ikome, 2007:150). Thus if the state facilitates 
development through good governance, it will grow in legitimacy and thus there will 
be state development. We will now look at the state in Africa in pre-colonial, colonial 
and post-colonial times. 
 
Pre-colonial African society was originally organised into small groups of hunter 
gatherers. Based on who was allowed to forage in a certain area and who was not, a 
distinction between insiders and outsiders developed (Mazrui, 1986:63). According to 
Mazrui, African society in time could be distinguished between what he calls lovers of 
land and lovers of animals. The lovers of animals such as the Masai of Eastern Africa 
valued their cattle, and lovers of land such as the Kikuyu, from Kenya, valued 
agricultural land (Mazrui, 1986:63). The agriculturalists were more inclined to state 
building and at times “states” formed such as the Baganda kingdom, or the Egyptian 
Empire. Whilst some settled societies kept order through “state power”, others, also 
agricultural in nature, kept order through tradition and custom, without taxation or 
centralisation of power (Mazrui, 1986:68-69). In Somalia the nation was united 
through clan lines and language, not through a central state (Mazrui, 1986:70). 
Pastoralists in contrast to agriculturalists were historically mostly organised into 
stateless groupings. Religion such as Islam was able to unify communities into central 
structures through shared values and laws such as the Shari’a, but even this strong 
unifying force mostly could not bring pastoralists (lovers of animals) into state 
structures (Mazrui, 1986:69). The importance of Mazrui’s arguments is that it shows 
that Africa was not a blank slate for development when European colonisers arrived. 
It was complex with a range of power structures. 
  
The main concern of the state in Africa under colonialism was the extraction of 
resources (Musah, 2003:160). Most institutions were either fashioned for the purpose 
of securing raw materials and resources, or to ensure pacification (Musah, 2003:160). 
There is broad consensus that the state fashioned by colonialism, but which remained 
intact after the colonial era ended, not only restricted policy but was also faced by a 
range of other inherent problems (Clapham, 1993:424; Clark, 1998:110; Englebert, 
2000:1822; Kieh, 2007a:3; Musah, 2003:160). The state was created for the colonisers 
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and not for the original African populations living within its borders, nor did it take 
account of the pre-colonial systems as mentioned by Mazrui (Clapham, 1993:424; 
Mazrui, 1986:63-70). Kieh (2007a:3) argues that after colonisation, the state remained 
a continuation of the Berlininst model formed during colonialism; an extracting or 
rent seeking force, rather than a benevolent facilitator of development benefiting the 
majority of the population.  
 
At the end of the colonial era, colonial governments, used a general model of 
decolonisation for many of their colonies. They implemented a once-off system of 
elections, multiple political parties, parliaments, written constitutions and a bill of 
rights. These generic models were ‘enhanced’ by brief training of local elites. The 
result frequently was “one man, one vote, once” (Chapham, 1993:425). As soon as the 
colonisers evacuated/retracted, rivals faced one another directly, often with one group 
dominating government and the state. This led to a sharp increase in ethnic violence 
which led to governments violently crushing opposition groups in the name of 
nationalism, unity and consolidation (Clapham, 1993:425). The new states were not 
embedded into African society (or related to African ‘states’ of the past), but rather 
remained foreign tools, to be used in the struggle for power and resources by the new 
elites (Kieh, 2007a:3; Musah, 2003:160-161). It was a colonially imposed state poorly 
adapted for the African society, environment and context. 
 
Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman, in their book, Politics and Society 
in Contemporary Africa (1999), describe three stages of change in African state 
development in the post-colonial era. During phase one, roughly the period of the 
1950s and 1960s, African rulers tried to overcome colonial problems and its legacy by 
centralising state power (Chazan et al, 1999:46). Centralisation took the form of 
curtailment of political competition, the formation and strengthening of dominant 
political parties, the expansion of the state administration to increase state control and 
often the monopolisation of decision making by the president and his executive 
(Chazan et al, 1999:46). In phase two, roughly the 1960s and 1970s, state structures 
were expanded further, leading to an overexpansion of the state with a significant fall 
in state effectiveness. There developed a gray-zone between the party and the state, 
with a merging of the two taking place. The state became a class on its own, acting as 
a rent seeking class, whilst being ineffective in the managing of the state apparatus 
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and the protection of citizens (Chazan et al, 1999:54-55; Musah, 2003:161). Phase 
three, visible around the 1970s and 1980s, saw the state at a point of crisis. 
Government by this time had lost the trust of its population, it had become 
overstaffed, and the public and private domains had become blurred. Abuse of public 
office had reduced the legitimacy of these offices, and there was a complete inability 
by formal institutions to fulfil their even most basic functions (Chazan et al, 1999:65-
66; Doornbos, 2010:52). Thomson summarises the African state in what we can 
identify as Chazan’s third stage as: overly centralised, one-party dominated and 
suffering under personal rule and clientelism (Thomson, 2004:108-113). Chazan et 
al’s three phases of state development forms the theoretical foundation of this 
research.  
 
There are also other ways of looking at the state, and especially state development. 
One of the main theories as such on state development is modernization theory. This 
theory became popular after World War II, but due to the changing nature of the term 
modernization is often difficult to define, even though it is clear how the term 
modernization is important to the study, as it looks at the modernization of two states 
in Africa (Tipps, 1973:199). Modernization theory remains popular due to the fact 
that the term modern always evokes an idea or understanding based on the present 
(Bendix, 1967:292). Modernization theory developed from the study of economic 
development, political stability and social/cultural change in the developing world by 
academics predominately from the United States. The theory was strongly influenced 
by the ideas of social evolution and functionalism, especially by the belief that the 
state is continuously altering to adapt to gradual change (Tipps, 1973:201). 
Modernization theory according to Bendix (1967:292) is a very useful term that 
encompasses all of “modern times”, according to him beginning around the year 1750 
lasting till the present. Due to this time frame Bendix argues that modernization 
should be seen to encompass the values of the times, including the idea of democracy, 
the destruction of inherited privilege, the visible decrease in the percentage of the 
population who are directly involved in agriculture and the declaration of equal rights 
of citizenship (Bendix, 1967:292-295). We now turn to the state and state formation in 
Zaire/DRC. 
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Zaire received independence from Belgium in 1960 after 80 years of brutal 
exploitative repression and colonialism (Clark, 1998:110; Coleman & Ngokwey, 
1993:306). The colonial authority made little to no effort whilst in power to unite the 
ethnically diverse and geographically large country (it is the 10
th
 largest country on 
Earth); nor did they train an elite to take power after independence (Clark, 1998:110; 
Coleman & Ngokwey, 1993:306; Fairhead, 1992:17). By the time of independence 
there were only 16 indigenous university graduates in the Congo (Botswana would 
reach independence with 22) (Reno, 2006:45; Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:4) 
According to Coleman and Ngokwey (1993:306), the Congo suffered more than any 
other state from the brutality of colonialism. After political instability and the 
assassination of the first elected post-colonial president, Patrice Lumumba, Colonel 
Mobutu took power in a bloodless coup d’état in 1965. Under the monarchic 
president, Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-1997), Zaire was turned into a kleptocracy (Clark, 
1998:109-110; Coleman & Ngokwey, 1993:306). 
 
During the late 1960’s and the 1970’s Mobutu centralised power on himself as the 
president (Clark, 1998:112). Mobutu went as far as to declare, “l’état c’est moi” (I am 
the state) (Coleman & Ngokwey, 1993:307). Mobutu launched a process of 
unification, centralisation, pacification and stabilisation (Coleman & Ngokwey, 
1993:307). Throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s Mobutu was seen as a fairly successful 
state builder, reuniting Africa’s first failed state after its 1960’s collapse (Reno, 
2006:43). By 1980 Mobutu had however became less interested in the welfare of his 
country as he became more paranoid and obsessed with keeping power (Musah, 
2003:164; Reno, 2006:45). His regime began to cling to power through the use of 
violence, divide and rule tactics and the elimination and corrupting of any opposition 
forces. Mobutu was toppled in 1997 by Laurent Kabila. The country however did not 
recover after Mobutu’s fall. The World Health Organization estimated that 3.5 million 
people died as a result of war in the DRC between 1998 and 2001, that is 70 000 
people per month (Montague, 2002:103). The Congolese state suffered from chronic 
economic, political and social vulnerability. The question then is, how much of this 
can be explained by governance? 
 
Botswana’s experience in the post-colonial era sharply contrasts with that of the 
Zaire’s unstable and authoritarian example. The area today known as Botswana 
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emerged with the declaration by Britain in 1885 that it was turning Bechuanaland into 
a protectorate (Narayana et al, 2005:19; Parson, 1981:239). Pre-colonial society in 
Botswana consisted of chiefs, who were the major cattle owners and the political elite, 
and the peasantry which comprised the rest of the population (Parson, 1981:239-240; 
Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:8). The peasantry were mostly subsistence farmers 
and paid tribute to the elite with any surplus production. The elite supplied the 
peasantry with access to cattle which was used for milk and meat, as well as for 
ploughing in later years. In colonial times this ‘cattle’ link between the classes was 
never broken (Parson, 1981:239-240). This connection between political elite and 
governed is almost unique to Botswana. The authority of the Botswana elite who took 
power after independence had evolved through an enduring relationship between 
governed and elite (Samatar, 1999:28). Democracy in Botswana today is a mixture of 
modern and traditional, keeping the Tswana traditions of consultation, participation 
and consensus building and blending them with modern liberal democracy 
(Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:8). Botswana currently has a dominant party state, 
but holds regular free and fair elections (Narayana, et al, 2005:21; Sebudubudu & 
Lotshwao, 2009:5). 
 
After independence in 1966 Botswana started to experience continuous high growth 
(Narayana et al, 2005:20; Samatar: 1999:3). The country moved from having a Gross 
National Product (GNP) of US$60-US$80 per capita in 1966, to a GNP of US$1,800 
per capita in 1996 (Samatar, 1999:3; Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:4). Unlike many 
other modern African countries, Botswana has been able to keep corruption low, 
transparency high and patrimonialism to a minimum (Samatar, 1999:4; Sebudubudu 
& Lotshwao, 2009:8). Botswana ranks as the 30
th
 least corrupt country in the world 
(Narayana, et al, 2005:21). It has largely avoided poor governance, poor leadership 
and poor management. This is even more praise worthy due to Botswana’s diamond 
wealth (Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:4). Botswana’s economic growth was led by 
strict planning, policy analysis and the careful use of limited state reserves (Samatar, 
1999:4; Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:6-7). Botswana has always made use of 
liberal economics with decentralisation, a free market economy and free enterprise, 
with government as an economic facilitator, not an active participant (Narayana et al, 
2005:21; Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:6). Mineral revenues are used for 
development of infrastructure and delivering of government promises (Samatar, 
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1999:4; Sebudubudu & Lotshwao, 2009:7). Botswana’s elite have been collectively 
united in their striving for economic growth (Samatar, 1999:6). Due to lack of local 
capital, the government supplied development capacity (Samatar, 1996:8). The key 
aspect of interest in Botswana is however that it is considered to be an economic and 
political success story in Africa. Compared to Botswana, the DRC is a clear failure. 
This begs one to once more ask, how much of the DRC’s failure, just like Botswana’s 
success, can be contributed to its state development ‘model’ or governance? 
 
1.2.2 Research Rationale 
From the literature reviewed it is clear that the importance of the government in state 
development is not in doubt. The state is needed to supply public goods such as 
security and stability whilst providing needed resources such as capital in developing 
markets. This study will clarify the link between government actions (good 
governance versus poor governance) and its effect on the state’s development. 
Understanding governance and its effect on the development of the state and on 
societal development has been studied in an African context, but it needs further 
study. This study brings African best practice in state development into contrast with 
an African example of state failure. By contrasting Botswana, which is seen as a 
success story, with Zaire/DRC, which is seen as a failure, it is expected that possible 
reasons for Botswana’s success versus Zaire/DRC’s failure will become evident. This 
study will investigate the importance of governance to try and determine if the reason 
for Botswana’s success can be found in its state development process. Finding a best 
practice for African development can have very important lessons for the rest of 
Africa. 
 
The study will use the work of Chazan et al, 1999, and their three phases of the state 
as a theoretical background and tool for analysis and comparison. Their work is 
especially useful for understanding governance, both in regards to policy formulation 
and institution creation. 
 
1.2.3 Problem Statement 
In the era of the pre-eminence of the state, making use of a comparison between 
Botswana and Zaire/DRC, what is the influence and effect, of state institution 
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formation and policy implementation (governance) by governments, on state 
development in terms of economical-, political- and social development? 
 
1.2.4 Contribution to Field 
The research done by this study will make a variety of contributions. Firstly it will 
add to the overall debate on the role of the state. It will seek to show how certain 
governance choices made by government have possible effects on development, 
including social-, economical- and political development, with increased returns over 
time. Increased returns can be both positive and negative. In other words, it will 
clarify the role that state structure and policy shaped by government plays in the 
development of a state. Furthermore this study will be of value to future research, 
especially for topics focused on democratisation and policy analysis. Democracy is 
not a necessity for growth, but some aspects of democracy are indeed beneficial to 
growth and development. Showing what policies work best in a certain context aids in 
shaping ideas on and understanding of best practice. Thus, most importantly, this 
study will try to find a possible best practice for African development, which will hold 
very important lessons for African states.  
 
This study does nonetheless remain descriptive in nature and will not be determining 
causality. Rather its value will be in exposing processes in the past from which 
modern states, especially African states, can benefit if they understand and learn from 
the experiences of the case studies. 
 
1.3 Research Design 
1.3.1 Research Design and Research Methodology 
This is a descriptive study, using the research design of a comparative cross-national 
study. The two case studies are compared to one another and conclusions are drawn 
from the differences between the two (Mouton, 2004:154). Differences in government 
practice and the consequential outcomes in development become evident when the 
governance style of Botswana is compared to the governance style of the DRC. 
Governance in Botswana leads to positive development and governance in the DRC 
leads seemingly to state collapse. The comparative nature of the study thus allows for 
conclusions to be drawn on what seems to be best practice. The case studies in this 
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research were selected on grounds of theoretical persuasion, with Botswana being best 
practice and the DRC being a failed state (Mouton, 2004:154).  
 
This study makes use of two main variables, governance and development. 
Development is the dependent variable and governance is the independent variable. 
Governance is defined by the World Bank’s definition, which states that governance 
is: 
 “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. 
This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; 
the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; 
and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them" (Kaufman & Kraay, 2008:6).  
This study defines good governance as being a governance style that promotes 
the creation of strong, open, equal and free political and economic institutions (Ikome, 
2007:147). It supports the maintenance of checks and balances on power, it is anti-
corruption geared and improves and maintains the delivery of services normally 
associated with state governments (Ikome, 2007:148). Good governance in this study 
is measured by making use of the good governance indicators of the World Bank, 
either directly or through qualitative analyses strongly based on the indicators as a 
guideline (Kaufman & Kraay, 2008:7). The six indicators are: voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and lastly, control of corruption. 
 
Development is measured in three groups in this study, as political-, economic- and 
social development; this is done in the context of state legitimacy. State legitimacy is 
the acceptance of the society governed that the state is the natural centre of power in a 
territory (Thomas, 2004:15-16). Legitimacy is high when state coercion is low and 
when the state is able to project its power in the entirety of its territory.  
 
Socio-economic development is defined with the United Nations Human 
Development Index (UNHDI) in mind. This means that development abides by three 
values: sustenance, the ability to meet basic needs such as shelter, freedom, security 
and health; self-esteem, to be used for the communal good and lastly; freedom from 
servitude, which increases people’s ability to choose and to increase the range of 
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human choice (Todaro & Smith, 2009:20-21). This study further accepts the definition 
that development should have three objectives, loosely based on the three values of 
development. The first objective of development, based on the value of sustenance, is 
the increase in the delivery by the state of basic life sustaining goods. The second 
objective is the raising of living standards by increasing incomes, job creation and 
better education. This meets the values of self-esteem and freedom from servitude. 
The third and final objective of development is the expanding of economic and social 
choices available to individuals, freeing them from servitude (Todaro & Smith, 
2009:22). Thus development in the case studies will be measured in political, 
economic and social development as these encompass all three values and objectives 
of development as defined (Todaro & Smith, 2009:20-22). The indicators for 
economic-, political- and social development will be looked at in chapter two.     
 
1.3.2 Limitations and Delimitations 
This study is complicated by the fact that it requires data in diverse fields, for two 
countries, over roughly 50 years. The DRC has much less readily accessible data 
especially from government sources, yet there is a wide range of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) that have compiled databases on the DRC. Care has also been 
taken in the selection of variables so as to ensure that they remain researchable. 
However it should clearly be stated that some of the data sources used do not go back 
further than the 1990’s which puts a clear limitation on the use of these sources for 
use in only phase three of Chazan et al’s (1999) framework. For the other two phases 
data will be supplemented with qualitative research.  
The use of these data bases in phase three if correlated to the trajectory of phases one 
and two will also clearly establish validity. The ratings for social development in 
phase three for example is rated by using the Human Development Index (HDI). Thus 
the HDI is used throughout as a guideline for analysis. Political development is again 
measured by making use of Freedom House ratings which are once more used as a 
measure of analysis throughout. Thus qualitative analyses will not limit the validity of 
the study, as supplementary research is clearly based on the indicators used in the data 
bases that will be used in phase three. 
 
This study is delineated to a focus on the post-colonial era, between the 1950s and the 
1990s. Although earlier periods such as the pre-colonial and the colonial eras are 
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briefly looked at, the focus remains on the post-colonial era. As Zaire received 
independence in 1960 it is analysed mainly from 1960 to the middle of the 1990s 
(Freund, 1998:198-199). Botswana received independence in 1966 and thus the focus 
of analysis for Botswana is between 1966 and the 1990s (Parson, 1981:240-241).  
 
This study is further limited by being mostly descriptive in nature. It will relay events 
along with possible observations but causality between governance and development 
will not be tested or proven. 
 
1.3.3 Chapter Overview 
This research is presented in six chapters. The first is the introduction, having 
presented the scope of research in the field so far. The second chapter provides an 
overview of the theoretical framework used in this research. It will also further 
discuss the indicators for the variables. Chapter three will be looking at the case of 
Zaire. It will be the first case study discussed because it is a classic example of 
African state failure. Botswana is the second case study and is discussed in chapter 
four. This chapter looks at how Botswana was able to achieve reasonable success in 
development through good governance. Chapter five will compare the two case 
studies, allowing for conclusions to be made on good governance and development. It 
will also include a general concluding summary. 
 
 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the research in the field of development, governance and 
the state in Africa, with a focus on the postcolonial era. Even though the state is not a 
completely foreign concept to Africa, it has been shown that the current state system 
and its borders are in many regards remnants of the colonial era. There are studies that 
have looked at the different fields investigated, such as good governance, 
development and the state in Africa, but this study brings African best practice in state 
development into contrast with an African example of state failure. The results of this 
study will help in understanding processes in the past from which states can benefit, in 
terms of development. 
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Chapter 2: Evaluating Governance and Measuring Development 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will define and elaborate on the frameworks, variables and concepts used 
in the research. The main framework is the three developmental phases of the state, as 
described by Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman (1999). The two 
most important variables are governance and development. Governance is the 
independent variable and development is the dependent variable. Both governance 
and development are measured by evaluating indicators. The listing and explanation 
of these indicators are amongst the most important aspects discussed in this chapter. 
Governance is measured as either “good” or “poor” by making use of the World Bank 
Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufman & Kraay, 2008). 
Development on its part is divided into three sub-variables; political-, economic- and 
social development, with each having its own set of indicators. 
 
This chapter will be organised into three sections. Section one looks at the pre-
colonial and colonial era. This creates a context for the period leading up to 
independence and for the post-colonial years. The second section follows the 
trajectory of development of the African state as discussed by Chazan et al. It 
broadens on the framework thus far presented. The third section looks at the variables 
and their indicators, presenting these in detail and explaining the methodology. We 
now turn to the challenges faced by the state in Africa. 
 
2.2 Challenges to the State in Africa 
It is important to briefly look at some of the problems experienced during state 
building in Africa. This section helps to provide the context in which state 
development occurs in Africa, illuminating some of the challenges to state 
development, with a clear focus on pre-colonial and colonial times. Furthermore this 
section aims to expand upon the literature review provided in chapter one. 
 
According to Mazrui (1986:63-79) pre-colonial or traditional African society naturally 
evolved into two groupings. The one was sedentary and based its survival on the 
growing of crops. The other sector of society followed a nomadic life, herding their 
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cattle and livestock from graze land to graze land, never settling permanently. It is 
important to note that both of these cultures evolved from the hunter gatherer groups 
of which a few examples still exist today, such as the Khoisan of the Kalahari and the 
BaMbuti or “Pygmies” of the DRC. The groups that originated from the hunter-
gatherers were either lovers of land or lovers of animals. The agriculturalists were 
lovers of land and valued it as their prime source of wealth because they needed it for 
crop growing. The lovers of animals valued animals such as camels and cattle as a 
means of increasing social standing. For the lovers of animals, land was only 
important as a temporary source of food for their animals, they never settled 
permanently. The Masai for example believe that they are the chosen people by god as 
custodians of all the cattle on earth. For this reason they have traditionally “not (been) 
animated by a territorial imperative; they (have been) animated by a cattle imperative, 
regardless of territorial boundaries” (Mazrui, 1986:64). The Masai thus became 
infamous for their cattle raiding across territorial boundaries, a clear contrast to the 
agriculturalist groups who operated within borders. The Masai, like other lovers of 
animals, were less preoccupied with boundaries and lived in societies governed by 
consensus with decentralised power (Mazrui, 1986:64-67). 
 
The agriculturists with their need for land were generally more inclined to state 
formation, and all groupings that could today be classified as states that developed in 
pre-colonial Africa were agriculture based sedentary societies (even though they also 
additionally reared animals). These states did not necessarily look exactly like 
European states. Some had elaborate governance structures with clear arrangements of 
authority and coercion whilst others were much less centralised. Nonetheless, there 
existed societies of political organisation with centralised access to power and force 
which was used for political control (Mazrui, 1986:67). It is interesting to note that 
even though all states were based on agriculturalims, not all agriculturalist societies 
formed into states. The Tiv of Nigeria for example were agriculturalist in nature but 
they had no centralised authority, no taxation, no codified law or forms of tribute 
(Mazrui, 1986:69).  
 
Other than agriculture, African societies also experienced centralisation tendencies 
when they were confronted with Islam (religion). Islam brought with it its codified 
law, the Shari’a and its taxation, Islamic Zakat, which were naturally disposed to the 
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promotion of official political organisation. Islam led to the creation of city states 
such as the Swahili city states in East Africa, and the empire states such as the ancient 
Mali and Songhay in West Africa. However, not even Islam was able to unite 
pastoralists into states. The Somalis in the Horn of Africa resisted state formation 
even with the spread of Islam until the arrival of European powers (Mazrui, 1986:69). 
 
Africa in the pre-colonial era not only included hunter-gatherer societies, but also 
settled agricultural societies and semi-nomadic herding societies. The first had almost 
no concept of borders; the second was the closest in likeness to the European societies 
that developed states in Europe. During colonialism it was the lovers of animals, such 
as the Masai that refused to be lured by the Western imperialism. The Masai could not 
be lured by the cash crops sold by the agriculturalists and refused to enter the 
capitalist system. Interestingly some believe that commercialising Africa’s cattle 
farming would go a long way to solving many famine related problems on the 
continent. However, into the modern era groups such as the Masai have remained 
stubbornly idealistic. It is said that some Masai would rather let their cattle starve and 
die in times of drought than sell them (Mazrui, 1986:66). In contrast the 
agriculturalists often embraced the education and economic possibilities made 
available by the European colonisers. They started planting cash crops, and the 
Kikuyu of Kenya even started building their own schools and collecting money for the 
hiring of European missionaries as teachers (Mazrui, 1986:66-69). 
 
Nevertheless Herbst (2000:11-12) argues that the African state could never have 
‘evolved’ in the same way as the state did in Europe due to differing contexts. 
Comparing African and European states he notes that the most of Africa comprised 
(and comprises) out of large areas with low population densities. The higher the 
population density of a territory the cheaper it is to govern a state, thus African states 
were and are more expensive and difficult to govern than European states. African 
states have had to overcome their difficult natural environments as well. Mountain 
ranges, jungles and large rivers have made ordinary activities such as transport 
difficult. The main political problems or problems of political geography in Africa are 
summarised in five factors by Herbst. He believes that African states struggled to 
impose themselves on their territories because they have had low population densities 
that have made it expensive to govern the large territories. Secondly states often did 
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not have access to large economic surpluses and this meant that they have been unable 
to be stimulated by trade surpluses as happened in Europe. In the third place African 
states have almost always had an abundance of land. In Europe competition for land 
meant that states needed to secure their border lands, strengthen their physical borders 
and ensure that power was exerted throughout the countryside. This was done to 
prevent neighbouring countries/states from conquering territory. African states did not 
have much incentive to go to war over land. The benefit of more territory for African 
states has often seemed limited. This reduced feeling of insecurity for African states 
has led to a reduced need for solidifying power throughout state territories (Herbst, 
2000:13).  
 
A fourth challenge to African states has been inhospitable territories and a fifth 
environmentally diverse areas. African states often govern areas that are not suitable 
for large populations. Around 50 per cent of Africa is not suitable for large 
populations due to inadequate rainfall. Africa has a third of all arid land in the world. 
This means that it has been unlikely and even impossible for African population 
density to increase enough to become comparable to that of Europe as the 
environment does not make this possible. Lastly European states are mostly made up 
out of geographically similar territories. African states on the other hand can have 
areas of jungle, desert, coastland, mountain ranges, deserts, savannahs and deltas, all 
in the same country. As each of these areas requires a different model of governance 
the cost of governance but also the cost to the physical expansion of state power 
(building roads and establishing service providing municipalities for example) has 
been drastically increased (Herbst, 2000:11-13). 
 
Colonialism and its legacies have also provided a number of challenges for state 
development in Africa. Clapham in his article, Democratisation in Africa: obstacles 
and prospects (1993:424), looks at how the colonisation and later decolonisation 
process led to the politicising of ethnicity and identity. In the post-colonial era the 
focus on ethnicity and race would often remain a cause of concern reducing the unity 
in African states. Added to this problem are the unnatural borders in Africa. These 
borders combine ethnic groupings that have been rivals since before the colonial era 
into single governed areas. During colonialism, with its use of divide and rule, there 
were almost no attempts to create unity amongst ethnic groups, which means that with 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
17 
 
the added politicising of ethnicity, escalation in tension was to be expected (Clapham, 
1993:424).  
 
Kieh (2007) argues that the colonial state was built with the need for power and 
wealth acquisition as central. Colonial rule rested upon oppression in various forms 
and the elimination of democracy. The state used the population for accumulation, but 
did not deliver services (Kieh, 2007a:5-7; Musah, 2003:160). The post-colonial state 
was to follow this example set by the colonial powers. The state was not new to 
Africa, but the Berlinist State model that was implemented was. Having taken control 
of the state structures after independence the new African elite acted in the same way 
as their colonial predecessors, often with one ethnic group oppressing others. As in 
colonial times, the post-colonial state remained absolutist, violent, predatory and 
imposed (Kieh, 2007a:7).  
 
The colonial period created or acted as the example of how a state, and in particular 
the Berlinist or centralised state, functioned and was administered. Engelbrecht 
(2000:1822) claims that the “arbitrary imposing” of the state in Africa without 
respecting pre-colonial institutions, norms and authorities has led to a decrease in 
growth. Growth was not intended for the good of the population but for the benefit of 
the coloniser and the extraction economy. This colonial mentality and governance 
style was to carry over to the post-colonial times. 
 
2.3 Framework: Phases of State Development  
Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman (1999) developed a theory based 
on the development trajectories that African states followed in post-colonial years. In 
their book they describe what they call the “constructions of the public arena since 
independence”, or as it is called here, the three phases of state development in the 
post-colonial era (Chazan et al, 1999:46-68). These three phases serve as the 
theoretical base for the research of this study and will be referred to as the Chazan-
framework.  
 
Phase one: “The concentration of State Power” (1950/60-1960/1970). Phase one is 
the time frame directly after independence during which the new African governments 
took power for the first time. In general the main characteristic of this phase was the 
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centralisation of state power. There were a number of factors which came together in 
the post-independence era which created a political atmosphere conducive to 
centralisation. The first of these was the power held by liberation movements. 
Regularly after successfully opposing a colonial government, the organisation that 
was seen as responsible for the granting of independence, transformed itself into a 
political party. This political party also often enjoyed wide flexibility in policy 
choices with little opposition due to its liberation history. In other words the liberation 
party had the political leeway to concentrate power on itself if it saw fit. Clapham 
(1993:424) has done a study looking at what he calls the “freedom fighter presidents”. 
He found that these presidents in general centralised power on themselves and did not 
allow opposition in their countries but rather claimed that centralisation was in the 
national interest. This argument is similar to that presented by Chazan et al (1999).  
 
In a recent study Melber (2009) found that parties which take power after liberating a 
country are often incapable of accepting normalisation and loss of power after the 
liberation war is won. These liberation movements turn the liberation struggle into a 
myth and fall back to it in times of opposition. They see themselves as the only ones 
entitled to power and portray it as being in the national and public interest that all who 
oppose them should be removed or silenced (part of the process of impedance, as 
discussed by Chazan et al). Where opposition becomes strong, the liberation struggle 
(after independence) becomes a permanent ‘phenomenon’. In this process, the 
liberation movement itself becomes the oppressor by “tend(ing) to reproduce the past 
rather than offer true alternatives… it becomes questionable whether there is a true 
difference between the political systems they manage to throw out and what they 
establish in their place” (Melber, 2009:452-453). In other words the liberation 
movement in time begins to cling to power even when it is suffering from loss of 
legitimacy. Due to this these governments become oppressive because they limit the 
political freedom in their countries as a way to secure power. By limiting freedom and 
competition the liberation movements become the oppressors. Having taken control of 
the state structures after independence the new African elite acted in the same way as 
their colonial predecessors. As in colonial times, the post-colonial state thus remained 
absolutist, violent, predatory and imposed (Kieh, 2007a:7). 
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A second reason for centralisation was that the systems used by governments after 
independence were largely colonial in origin. There was thus no moral obligation for 
liberation governments to keep the government structures in place left by the 
colonisers. First constitutions in the early post-colonial African states also carried 
very little value. These constitutions were merely regarded as aids in the rapid transfer 
of power; they were never seen as a true reflection of the needs and values of the 
African populations. Secondly, the Westminster system, dominant in British areas, 
and the presidential system dominant in French areas, were inadequately adapted for 
local African circumstances (Musah, 2003:161). There was also a lack of local 
expertise to operate these systems. This caused other options to be explored more 
readily. Weak independent middle classes were the third reason. The state and its 
structures were the only real viable source of capital for the newly independent 
populations. There were no social conditions for political competition and the state 
remained the primary source of power and wealth. Thus if one wanted to increase 
your wealth or position, there was almost no other option than going into government 
and joining the ruling elite. The fourth reason is seen by Chazan et al, to be the most 
important; the threat of a failing system. Destabilisation after independence was easily 
blamed on the remaining colonial state structures by the new political elites. This, 
according to them, led to a ‘need’ for centralisation and curtailment of liberty in the 
name of regaining control of the state “in the interest of the public good” (Musah, 
2003:161).  
  
In phase one, after consolidation and centralisation of political power, state 
administration was enlarged promoting elite rule. Legislatures became sanctioning 
bodies, following the will of the dominant political elites. Parastatals were frequently 
created at this time with the stated intent, true or not, that they would increase 
development. According to Chang (2003:199-206) parastatals do have or can some 
economic benefits. Public enterprises can supply the capital needed for the creation of 
competitive enterprises in countries where private capital is low. Public enterprise is 
also a logical choice for capital intensive industries such as electricity, transport and 
telecommunications. These industries need such vast sums of investment that private 
investors can often not afford to fund them, leaving the state as the supplier of capital. 
Lastly, public enterprises can be used very successfully if implemented and used 
within a national plan where the different companies complement one another and the 
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national plan. This mostly requires oversight by the government. However, the 
creation of parastatals in Africa very often did not have these beneficial effects. 
Instead they contributed to the overextension of the state which led to decreases in the 
creation of public goods, economic growth, skilled manpower and organisational 
capacity (Chang, 2003:199). African public enterprises in general have been 
economically and socially unprofitable causing little if any positive change. This has 
often been due to rent seeking, corruption, lack of coordinated planning and the 
politicising of economics (Chang, 2003:200). 
 
Armies and police forces were also enlarged and modernised to increase state power. 
The state thus was increasing its power and presence on all levels. State positions, as 
mentioned, became the access point to state resources. This led to an increase in the 
number of state personnel and higher administration costs. Very often the main 
political party increased in significance, with party members filling civil service, 
police, army and local government positions. What was created was a state that 
limited political pluralism, emphasised statism, bureaucratic structures, politicisation 
of administrative institutions and with fragile power and legitimacy (Nafziger & 
Auvinen, 2002:154). The state became distant from its subjects with elite politics 
turning into a patrimonial system (Doornbos, 2010:51). Thus the state in phase one 
experienced the processes of impedance and facilitation (Chazan et al, 1999:47).  
 
The process of impedance is the implementation of measures that are limiting to 
opportunities of opposition. It often involves the outlawing of rival political 
organisations and a reduction in opportunities for people to raise issues they are 
unsatisfied with. During impedance the government equates unity with uniformity. 
Disagreeing with the political elite becomes an act viewed as treason. Impedance 
leads to the dismantling of multiparty politics. The process of facilitation is the 
augmenting of state power through the strengthening of the central administration, the 
military and police (coercive apparatus) and of the executive. 
 
Phase two: “Elaboration of State Power” (1960/70-1970/80). Phase two saw the state 
and its structures expand further. In time, state expansion led to an overextension of 
the state. When this happened there was a clear fall in the effectiveness of the state. 
The state and the political party fused into one with the state and positions in it being 
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the reward for loyalty to the party, the political elite or the executive. Even when there 
were no qualified individuals, state positions, old and newly created, were 
continuously filled by unqualified and semi-trained individuals due to calls for the 
Africanisation of the bureaucracy and the needs of the political elites. A bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie was formed with their own needs as their priority. 
 
The colonial state was built around the acquisition of wealth, rarely with any attempt 
to economically or socially uplift the colonised; the post-colonial state continued this 
tradition with the civil service bourgeoisie taking the place of the colonisers (Kieh, 
2007a:5). Government posts and parastatal revenues became absorbed into the 
patrimonial network. The state became an unwieldy structure with interests removed 
from its population’s. State dependence in this phase reached alarmingly high levels. 
During the 1960’s the civil service in Africa annually grew by 7per cent. By 1970, 60 
per cent of all wage earners were government employees and by 1980, on average 
between 50 per cent and 80 per cent of government revenues were spent on 
supporting the civil service (Chazan et al, 1999:55). The state-owned enterprises in 
phase two lost most of their pretence to be operating for the benefit of all, but rather 
became the domain of political leaders who used parastatals for making political 
appointments and to enrich themselves and their cronies. These structures which were 
meant as centres of growth became obstacles to effective economic expansion. 
 
Legal order was also attacked in phase two. This is because the courts were the only 
structures remaining outside of government influence. In general, court structures 
initially withstood government led assaults. Where government was however unable 
to change the courts, it often started to change the laws. The dominance of the state 
and its coercive power thus strongly and adversely affected the judiciary and 
separation of powers. The state expanded its coercive powers through increases in the 
police and military. Where the loyalty of troops became uncertain, use was made of 
personal paramilitary forces. The military as a result become more important, leading 
to even greater complexity in keeping control of the state. In Africa it was in time 
often the enlarged military that became politically active and destabilising leading to 
the more frequent occurrence of coups d’états. Towards the end of phase two but also 
during it, control of the state by its leaders become increasingly uncertain. 
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The political machinery of the state was by now subjected to the executive, which 
limited political manoeuvring severely. Single and one party systems still had 
parliaments, but these were no longer free in any way and merely represented the 
western idea without the values. Some states even became no party states and the 
mixed state/“party” relationship led to higher patronage. In some states Marxism was 
used to feign legitimacy. Thus phase two saw the erosion of African government’s 
popular foundations. Control for leaders became uncertain due to an exclusion of 
channels to political involvement, loss of legitimacy and the need for large military 
forces to keep control of the state.  
 
Phase three: “The Reconsideration of State Power” (1970/80-1980/90). Government 
by this time, through the favouring of groups and patrimonial networks, had lost the 
trust of its population. Government structures had become overstaffed and very costly 
to run. Government over consumed on taxes in salaries reducing state capacity; thus it 
took much but gave very little in return. The public and private domains had become 
blurred with the state serving as a source of personal enrichment. Abuse of public 
office had reduced the legitimacy of these offices. Government in phase three suffered 
from an inability to fulfil its most basic functions (Chazan et al, 1999:65-66; 
Doornbos, 2010:52).  
 
The state in phase three faced dwindling resources, increasing violence and 
decreasing capabilities, all contributing to possible state collapse (Nafziger & 
Auvinen, 2002:154). Kieh, (2007a:9-12) further extends phase three and the 
understanding thereof by looking at state failure. He shows that the state in Africa 
failed in five ways. The first of these was cultural failure, which was the failure of 
creating nation bonds. Instead of working towards unity personal agendas were 
forwarded for example by playing on ethnicity; this lead to disunity in society. 
Secondly, economic failure was the inability of the African state to reduce economic 
vulnerability. States too often relied (and rely) on single commodities or industries for 
income and thus become vulnerable to international price changes. Political failure, 
thirdly, looked at the strength of authoritarianism in Africa. Authoritarianism reduced 
or eliminated freedom of speech and the press, freedom of association, freedom of 
assembly and even in the extreme freedom of movement. Security failure was the 
fourth state failure. It was the inability of the state to maintain peace and stability. The 
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military was often too important, leading to the militarisation of politics. Further, 
security failure was due to all the other state failures combined thus in the end causing 
African states to suffer from endemic suspicion, mistrust and conflict. The last state 
failure was social failure. Social failure was the general failure of the state to deliver 
in addressing social needs such as education, health, and sanitation (Kieh, 2007a:9-
12). 
 
Carment, Prest and Samy (2010), describe state collapse as when the state “is unable 
to perform the most basic functions” expected of it. State collapse occurs after a long 
process of deterioration, decline and erosion of the state and its foundations (Carment 
et al, 2010:47). Ethnic grievances due to unequal access to power, including access to 
resources, leads to conflict which at times leads to state collapse (Carment et al, 
2010:48). There are however a range of reasons that could lead to or contribute to 
state collapse, these include internal factors such as a weak linkage between state and 
society, greed for resources, excessive concentration of power and political and 
economic mismanagement (Carment et al, 2010:49). External factors include 
destabilisation by a neighbouring country for geopolitical or economic gain and 
general forces emanating from the world economy such as the financial crisis of 2008 
(Carment et al, 2010:50). Carment et al also list a variety of danger signs for when a 
state is at risk of collapse. We will now briefly look at a few of these.  
 
The first danger sign is when the corrupt usage of state assets and the power of state 
rulers have become so extreme that old allies are beginning to show opposition. An 
example of this is Somalia under Barre or Zaire under Mobutu where the state became 
the private domain of the ruler and opposition began to build. A second danger sign is 
when it becomes clear that state institutions are no longer in touch with the socio-
economic needs of their citizens and that the state has therefore institutionalised the 
wrong values (Carment et al, 2010:51). In a state where there is strong competition for 
resources and where this competition has become violence based there is also a risk of 
state collapse. This is especially true for countries where there is a dispersion of 
violence, private armies and rebel groups leading to state institutions becoming 
irrelevant. Further if the state suffers from conflict based on political and cultural 
orientation due to different cultural and ethnic interests, risk is increased. Secession 
attempts can also affect a country detrimentally, leading to widespread violence. 
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Deterioration of economic conditions leading to the breakdown of state institutions 
along with the states inability to provide security, including physical, health and 
nutritional security, is a further sign of collapse (Carment et al, 2010:52). States can 
collapse due to one or more of these reasons. Often the risks overlap, as one leads to 
the creation of another increasing the chances for collapse. 
 
An interesting analysis of state collapse is presented by Zartman (1995). According to 
him state collapse is more than just coups, rioting and rebellion (Zartman, 1995:1). 
State collapse is a situation in which the authority, structures, laws and political 
organization of a state has fallen apart. But it does not necessarily mean that there is 
anarchy. However Zartman claims that when a state collapses it does not necessarily 
mean that the state has lost legitimacy (one must clearly remember that there is a big 
difference between state and governance), but rather power and order are “up for 
grabs”. Legitimacy can nonetheless also be lost. When a state collapses it does go into 
a period in which legitimate central authority and order does not exist. In Africa state 
collapse is often associated with colonialism. Zartman agrees that the first collapse of 
Zaire in 1960/61 was colonial in origin, as it was rather a colonial state collapsing 
than a post-colonial state. However most African states that collapse are not a result of 
colonialism but either due to regime change between first and second generations in 
the second decade after independence; or secondly around the late 1980s and early 
1990s where governments are overthrown because they have centralised power too 
much and excluded the rest of the population from power and wealth (Zartman, 
1995:2-5). This links up with phase three in the framework presented by Chazan et al. 
State collapse is ultimately marked by the collapse of control over the political and 
economic spheres. The economic influence of the state retracts until it is limited 
around capital cities. The formal economy is overtaken by the informal and economic 
life in rural areas begins to connect to neighbouring countries even using foreign or 
neighbouring currency. At the same time the political arena increases in size as 
neighbours begin to house dissident groups and allow them to launch raids from their 
territories often supported by national troops from those countries. In essence Zartman 
claims that to restore a state, the national economy should “flow” throughout a state’s 
territory and national politics should once more be limited to the national physical 
territory (Zartman, 1995:9).   
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By the beginning of the 1990’s African states faced very weak economies. African 
militaries were reduced in size due to low revenue and aid. Government salaries were 
reduced at this time leading to increased corruption as officials looked for new 
sources of income. This again led to further loss of state legitimacy. Due to this 
endemic state weakness governments were forced to democratise (Clapham, 
1993:434). However, this often did not happen due to a change in democratic values, 
but rather it was an attempt to keep power. The problem is that democracy is not a 
form of government for keeping the weak in power. With the state reduced in phase 
three, implementation of democracy and development became excessively hard 
(Clapham, 1993:434). For democracy there is a need for popular consensus, 
acceptance of responsibility by leaders and measures to ensure accountability; this 
however was missing (Clapham, 1993:423; Williams, 2003:3). Where there is low or 
no state legitimacy, not only is the government illegitimate, but the whole state 
structure can become illegitimate. It makes an unstable foundation for democracy.  
 
Nafziger and Auvinen (2002:154-155) summarise the interaction of different 
processes on development in Africa. According to them the policies implemented by 
elites are most often the reasons behind humanitarian emergencies and violence. 
Undemocratic and destructive systems benefit the rule of the political elites, who 
would have lost power in a system where the economy and political freedom was 
improving. When Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth slows or declines due to 
poor policies the elite through their rent-seeking practices cause further stagnation. 
This in turn leads to a loss of legitimacy, which in turn leads to the need for increased 
use of force to maintain power. This predator rule creates circumstance under which 
the institutions and foundations of the state and the economy begin to degrade. Elites 
and their clients position themselves to maximise their own short term profits without 
planning for the future. State collapse is often accelerated by rent-seeking in predatory 
states which erupt into violence due to the unequal distribution between regional and 
ethnic divisions. 
 
We will now briefly look at the theory of modernization. Modernization came to 
prominence after World War II. However what is meant by modernization is often 
confused as it is difficult to attach any constant meaning to variables that can test 
modernization; due to the nature of the word “modern”, change is inevitable (Bendix, 
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1967:292; Tipps, 1973:199). For this reason it is important that we look at what 
modernization theory is, because even though it is not directly used as a tool of 
analyses by the research it does look at the changes occurring in a state that are 
beneficial to its population in general. The first important aspect of modernization is 
that it occurs on many levels. It is not only something that is determined by one 
variable on an individual level or one variable on a state level, but rather something 
that can only be measured when looking at a complete picture (Tipps, 1973:202). 
Nonetheless it is mostly studied at a state level and focuses on industrialization, 
political development and economic growth. It would logically be impossible to 
include all possible variables in a given study. For this reason most studies only focus 
on a limited number of variables, knowing that the analyses would miss one or 
another variable (Tipps, 1973:202-203). The mistake that is however often made is 
equating modernization to only one or two variables, for example stating that 
industrialization or economic growth alone show modernization is occurring, what is 
needed is some broader confirmation (Tipps, 1973:203). 
 
According to Bendix (1967), as stated in the previous chapter, modernization has to 
be seen as a theory with its roots in the time of the American and French Revolutions 
(Bendix, 1967:292). Modernization theory is a theory on the modernization of a 
society or state, and even though it happens on many levels (state, individual, 
communal), there are some identifiable characteristics that are important. Bendix 
argues that the advent of the modern era is comparable to the Neolithic revolution and 
of similar importance. When a society or state modernizes, there is a transformation 
away from divine providence towards science as an analytical tool. Modern societies 
(once more according to Bendix) is made up out of people who deserve their status 
and wealth based on the work that they have done and not as in medieval and older 
societies based on inherited privilege. The modern state is one in which the 
percentage of the population who are engaged in agriculture has also dropped 
significantly.  It is a society where rights are inherent in citizenship and where 
democratic values are strengthening (Bendix, 1967:292-293).  
 
State development is thus something that can be measured in different ways, and one 
such method is modernization. Modernization theorists however do not hold to one 
single definition of modernization. Rather, and Bendix admits this, historical and 
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geographic factors can heavily influence a study. For many cases specific exceptions 
are needed, as modernization is limited (Bendix, 1967:317). It runs the risk of 
becoming western centric and it is almost undeniably influenced by western ideas and 
values. Thus this study acknowledges the theories and ideas of modernization, but 
applies these only loosely, based on the African and case specific challenges, in 
analysing state progress and state development. Political development as a case in 
point, as will be discussed later in the chapter, is for example analyzed by making use 
of variables that test democratisation, but not pure democracy as such. 
 
2.4 Variables 
2.4.1 Governance 
For this research the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) were selected to 
measure governance. The WGI is a project that has been measuring governance for 
the World Bank since 1996. It makes use of six main indicators, which are in turn 
based on a number of variables (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010:2). Due to the 
complexity of measuring something as intangible as governance this research decided 
to use the already established WGI, since it brings together diverse sources creating 
the opportunity for comparing two countries. The WGI with its six main indicators 
also gives a broad overview of the entire ‘range’ of possible governance indicators. 
Since this research does not focus on a specific sub-section under the term 
governance, the WGI is thus very useful for a complete overview (Kaufmann, Kraay 
& Mastruzzi, 2010:3).  
 
Governance, as mentioned in chapter one, is defined in this study according to the 
World Bank’s definition, which states that governance is: 
 “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. 
This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; 
the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; 
and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them" (Kaufman & Kraay, 2008:6).  
Good governance is a governance style that promotes the creation of strong, open, 
equal and free political and economic institutions (Ikome, 2007:147). Governance is 
measure by looking at six indicators, these are: voice and accountability, political 
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stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law and lastly, control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010:4).  
 
In this study the official WGI ratings will be used for measuring political 
development. These are the results that have been quantified and then analysed by the 
World Bank. In addition to this the research makes use of qualitative analyses based 
on the WGI indicators but analysed from data collected based on the indicators. The 
combination of the two will improve understanding and usefulness of the analysis 
since it increases insight. To do this the understanding of the indicators as listed below 
are qualitatively measured against the data available for the countries in the case 
study. We will now look at the different indicators. The definitions provided are taken 
from work done for the World Bank Group by Kaufman et al (2010). Qualitative 
analysis based on the WGI is used for the years preceding 1996 or for the first two 
phases of state development. 
 
Voice and Accountability 
Voice and accountability is the measuring of the extent of participation allowed to 
citizens of a country in the selecting of their governments. This also includes freedom 
of association, freedom of expression and the freedom of the media (Kaufmann et al, 
2010:4). 
 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
Political stability and absence of violence is the measuring of the likelihood or in 
other words risk that government power will be transferred along unconstitutional or 
through violent means. It also includes destabilisation, terrorism and politically 
motivated violence or aggressive acts (Kaufmann et al, 2010:4). 
 
Government Effectiveness 
Government effectiveness measures the quality of public services, the civil service 
and how independent the civil service is from government or political pressure. It also 
measures the implementation and formulation of policy, along with the commitment 
of the government to the implementation of these policies (Kaufmann et al, 2010:4). 
 
Regulatory Quality 
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Regulatory quality refers to the measuring of the ability of the government to create, 
implement and maintain beneficial policies; also policies and regulations that increase 
and benefit private sector development (Kaufmann et al, 2010:4). 
 
Rule of Law 
Rule of law analyses the degree of adherence to the laws of a country and the 
enforcement there of. This includes the protection of property rights, the quality of 
policing, the integrity of the court system as well as the risk of crime and violence 
(Kaufmann et al, 2010:4). 
 
Control of Corruption/Terrorism 
Control of corruption measures in what manner public power is used for public good, 
or in contrast for private gain. This includes both what is known as petty corruption 
and ‘grand forms’ of corruption. The difference is essentially in the size of corruption 
involved. This indicator also measures the extent to which elites and private interests 
have taken over the state (Kaufmann et al, 2010:4). 
 
A combined analysis made from the findings of the official WGI research and 
findings based on the qualitative analysis of data will allow the research to interpret 
the state of governance in the countries used in the comparative study. We will now 
look at development and the understanding thereof.  
 
2.4.2 Development 
The ideological aims of the term development as used in this study is understood as 
being based on three objectives; increasing delivery by the state of life sustaining 
goods, the raising of living standards and lastly the expansion of economic and social 
choice (Todaro & Smith, 2009:22). The three indicators of development for this study 
were thus selected based on the three objectives named above. These three indicators 
are political-, economic- and social development. The United Nations Human 
Development Index (UNHDI) also played a role in the selection of the three 
indicators. The UNHDI looks at the interaction of economic and social development. 
It is seen as a breakthrough in the measuring of development by giving a combined 
statistic for the economic and social progress in a country (UN, 2011).     
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After taking into account the literature surveyed, this study defines development as: 
 the political, economic and social progress made in a state by increasing the 
delivery of public goods and services, increasing life expectancy and by increasing the 
economic and political choice of its citizens and inhabitants. 
 
2.4.2.1 Political Development 
Political development refers to the process of creating an equal or fair society which 
can make decisions to benefit society as a whole. Political development in this study 
is measured by making use of data from Freedom House and presented in their 
Freedom ratings for countries (Puddington, 2011). In addition to the analysis given by 
Freedom House, supplementary data collected relating to the variables and their 
indicators used by Freedom House will be used. There are two variables; political 
rights and civil liberties. Political rights are measured by looking at three sub-
categories; electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of 
government. For civil liberties there are four subcategories, these are; freedom of 
expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, rule of law, and 
personal autonomy and individual rights (Puddington, 2011). 
 
2.4.2.2 Economic Development 
Economic development looks at how well a country is doing in real financial terms. 
This is useful because it shows whether a government policy, possibly even a highly 
criticised policy, is delivering financial benefit. In general economic development also 
gives us some indication of the wealth of a country and whether it is increasing. 
Economic development is measured by making use of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
figures were available (EIU, 2011). In addition, Gross National Product (GNP), 
foreign debt, trade statistics and related data is used to create an understanding of the 
economic situation of the case studies. 
 
2.4.2.3 Social Development 
Social development measures the quality of life of the majority. This is done by 
making use of a selection of Social Indicators drawn up by the Statistics Division, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (UN, 
1989). The selection is made by comparing the usage of social indicators in the list of 
UN Social Indicators to that of social indicators used by the World Bank in their 
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World Development Indicators (World Bank Group, 2010). From the World Bank this 
research finds child health, mother’s health, educational attainment and combating 
disease to be applicable (World Bank Group, 2010). From the UN Social Indicators 
this study will use education, health, housing, literacy and water supply and sanitation 
(UN, 1975). Out of these indicators we then form three broad categories; education, 
healthcare and service delivery. These three indicators will be used to qualitatively 
determine the state of social development in the case studies at different times. Social 
development in phase three (and in other phases if data is available) is measured by 
making use the Human Development Index (HDI) used by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP). The HDI rating measures both economic and social 
development, but since it focuses on individuals it is more useful in social 
development. The HDI rates countries and then assigns a number between one and 
zero. Zero is the lowest and represents very low social development, with one being 
the highest showing strong social (human) development. The three HDI dimensions 
used in analysis also correlates to the selected themes as these are health, education 
and living standards (UNDP, 2011). With the qualitative and quantitative measures 
correlating the integrity of analysis can be ensured and the lack of HDI analyses of 
phases one and two does not jeopardise the validity of the research. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Africa has had a long history of state structure formation and political organisation.  
Colonialism in a sense interrupted many of the processes that were taking place and 
imposed its own structures on Africa. In the post-colonial era the influence of 
colonialism remained. The state in Africa and its development after colonialism, 
though influenced by it at times, cannot be understood solely by looking at the 
colonial past. Old processes started before colonists ever arrived and process began 
after colonialism had ended, and these have also influenced state development. This 
chapter has relayed the framework presented by Chazan et al, and given academic 
support for the three phase development argument. The Chazan-framework will thus 
give the research the context in which to analyse the post-colonial era, its’ trajectories 
of state development and the interaction between governance and development. We 
will look at the case studies in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 3: State Development and Governance in Zaire 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will look at the history of state development in Zaire/the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC). The aim of the research is to determine whether there 
is a correlation between governance and development in the country. The DRC
3
 is the 
first case study studied in this research since it is seen as to have followed the classic 
trajectory of development as described in the Chazan-framework. The DRC is a 
country in central Africa that has historically and ethnic culturally little to no reason 
for being united into one single governed territory. Its origins as a united political unit 
is based on the greed of colonial Europe and arguably one of its cruellest colonial 
monarchs, king Leopold II of the Belgians. By 1900 most of the current day DRC had 
been united into one territory through imperialist design (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 
13). 
 
This chapter will firstly examine the origins of the state in the DRC. This is done by 
looking at the area of the modern DRC as it was before the arrival of colonialism, and 
secondly looking at the colonial rule of Leopold II and the Belgian government. This 
short introduction will provide an understanding of the context in which the post-
colonial state in the DRC developed. In the second section we will be turning to the 
Chazan-framework. In it, each of the three phases in the Chazan-framework’s 
trajectory of state development in Africa are applied to the DRC/Zaire consecutively. 
In essence each of these will consist of firstly a historical overview, followed by an 
analysis of the governance and development in the phase. Thus we will be able to 
follow the development trajectory of a case study and at the same determine the 
impact of governance on state development.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 The Democratic Republic of the Congo was known as the Congo by early European explorers. 
Between 1885-1908 it was known as the Congo Free State under Leopold II of Belgium. From 1908 
until 1960 the area was called the Belgian Congo whilst being under the authority of the Belgian 
government. It was called the Democratic Republic of the Congo after its independence from Belgium 
in 1960 and renamed to Zaire after Mobutu took power in 1965. With the fall of Mobutu in 1997, 
Laurent Kabila again renamed Zaire the République Démocratique du Congo, or the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Clark, 1998:109; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 13). 
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3.2.1 The Pre-colonial Congo 
The territory of the Congo is situated in central Africa in a vast area of culturally and 
linguistically related people. Most of these groups form part of the Bantu language 
cultural group. However, even though these groups share some traits, the Congo is 
made up out of about 250 different ethnic groups. It is interesting to note that many 
ethnic groups today live across national borders, a testimony to the synthetic colonial 
borders. Examples are, the Kongo, who are found in the DRC, Angola and Congo-
Brazzaville; the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, from the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, and the 
Lunda who are also found in Zambia and Angola (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 14). 
 
Bantu languages had not always been the main language and cultural group in the 
Congo. Recently archaeology has shown that the Bantu groups slowly moved into the 
Congo area over a time span of more than 4000 years. During this time they 
continuously interacted with the local hunter-gathers of the rainforests. Since the 
Bantu groups were agriculturalist they lived in relative peace with their forest 
neighbours as their ways of life were complementary to each other’s. In time the 
hunter-gatherers slowly began speaking the Bantu languages (Oliver & Atmore, 
2001:151,154). Agriculture was limited to yams, palm-oil and later bananas. There 
were thus sedentary agriculturalist societies in pre-colonial Congo, but the rainforests 
were not fertile enough to support larger political structures. Only when the Bantu 
expansion reached the lakes and fertile mountain valleys of the Western Rift and Nile-
Congo divide did it become more fast-moving and dynamic (Oliver & Atmore, 
2001:154). The agriculturalists of the Congo were divided into “households” and 
ruled by “big men”. In a village there might have been many families and thus big 
men. These groups were originally matrilineal and had egalitarian political structures. 
In time they however became patrilineal and villages became competitive, often 
leading to conflict. This shift was due to an influx of migrants from the north during 
the second millennium.  
 
With population increases and competition, new kingdoms evolved. Thus when the 
Portuguese arrived in 1482, they were able to make contact with the Bakongo 
federation, a kingdom with an elected, yet mostly hereditary king. Luxury European 
products such as Venetian beads and glazed china were imported, and slaves were 
exported. Christianity was also rather unsuccessfully implemented as a result of the 
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“converted” kings (Nöthling, 1989:279-280). The Boma kingdom emerged to the west 
of Lake Mai-Ndombe, with its climax in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The 
Kuba kingdom, by far the most important in the region, evolved between the Kasai 
and Sankuru tributaries of the Congo River. The kingdom planted crops imported 
from America by the Portuguese, including maize, cassava and tobacco. The kingdom 
had well developed and unique ritual and political institutions. It was also secure 
enough by 1800 that it dictated with whom it traded in the Atlantic trading system, 
even importing slaves and exporting ivory (Oliver & Atmore, 2001:157-161). 
 
In the 1840’s and the 1850’s the Swahili-Arabs from Zanzibar and their allies the 
Nyamwezi foraged into the Congo, extending the East African slave trade and ivory 
trade. They introduced Islam and Kiswahili. Thousands of Congo slaves were 
captured and then sold on the slave markets of the orient and Middle East. During the 
1850’s a Nyamwezi trader by the name of Msiri, founded the Garenganze state in 
Katanaga with its capital at Bunkeya. Msiri would be killed in 1891 by a Congo Free 
State officer, and his country would be assimilated into the colonial Congo Free State 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:14-15). We now turn to the colonial era. 
 
3.2.2 The Colonial Congo Free State 1885-1908 and the Colonial Belgian Congo 
1908-1960 
King Leopold II of Belgian’s4 interest was spiked in the Congo when he heard tales of 
its reported, but unproven, riches. Leopold very attentively followed the travels of 
African explorers. Between 1874 and 1877, Henry Morton Stanley, who famously 
found David Livingstone on the shores of Lake Tanganyika (“Doctor Livingstone I 
presume?”), travelled from Zanzibar to the mouth of the Congo River. His aim was to 
reclaim the Congo basin for the British throne. When Britain was uninterested, 
Leopold approached Stanley and made him his agent for colonising the Congo 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 14-23). 
 
Leopold used cunning and clever statesmanship to get what he wanted. In 1876, he 
convened the Association Internationale Africaine (AIA) (International African 
Association). At the conference he disguised his plans for the Congo as humanitarian 
                                                 
4
 The king of Belgium is officially referred to as king of the Belgians and not king of Belgium. 
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and scientific. Two years later he created the Comité d’études du Haut-Congo (The 
committee of the study of the High-Congo). A year later he renamed it to Association 
Internationale du Congo (AIC) (International Association of the Congo). The two 
organisations were cunningly confusingly named seeming to be similar. AIA however 
was scientific, and AIC was a company exclusively under Leopold’s control. In 1879 
Stanley left for the Congo, where he used duplicity and force to gather the thumb print 
signatures of Congo rulers, ceding their territories to the AIC flag, a blue standard 
with a single gold star. By secondly creating the basic infrastructure for empire, 
mostly by building roads, Stanley also created a justification of Leopold’s claims to 
the Congo by 1884. 
 
Leopold now needed to have his self-proclaimed sovereignty recognised. The United 
States were the first to recognise Leopold’s new country on 22 April 1884. France 
acknowledged Leopold’s claim after he signed a treaty which would cede the Congo 
to France if he could no longer maintain his presence. Germany accepted Leopold’s 
claim in the hope of improving relations with France. By the time of the Berlin 
Conference, all parties present (only excluding Turkey) had accepted Leopold’s claim 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 14-23). 
 
After having his territory acknowledged, Leopold needed to make his new possession 
profitable. Leopold had invested a lot of money and now needed to repay loans. 
However the area was not adapted to European economics and thus seemed to be 
highly unproductive by Leopold’s and his partners’ thinking. The colonial 
government thus resorted to extreme measures in an attempt to increase productivity 
which included murder, torture, human mutilation and other “inhumane methods” to 
force the Congolese to leave their way of life and rather produce what the colonial 
authority wanted. Internationally Leopold had portrayed the Congo Free State (the 
name that Leopold II gave the Congo) as a humanitarian venture against the slave 
trade. Ivory, but especially rubber, were the main sources of Leopold’s revenues. 
With the invention of rubber tyres, Leopold made laws forcing Congolese to supply 
labour, rubber and ivory to his agents. Villages that were not able to meet the daily 
quotas were subjected to rape, mutilation and murder (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 14-
23).  
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By 1908 only 8.5 million of the original 30 million strong Congolese population 
survived. Leopold’s greed had led to the death of tens of millions of people. Congo’s 
“king-sovereign” ruled the Congo Free State for 23-years as an absentee landlord and 
never set foot on Congolese soil. In Europe one can still see what the millions of 
abused Africans were murdered, raped and mutilated for. The Arcade du 
Cinqauntenaire in Brussels, the Tervuren Museum and extensions of the Royal Palace 
were all paid for in blood money (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 14-23). 
 
After Leopold’s crimes in the Congo Free State became an international 
embarrassment, the Belgium government took over control of the territory in 1908 
(MacGaffey, 1991:27). The Belgian Congo as it was now known, still however 
suffered from economic exploitation and political oppression. The constitution for the 
colony was made in collaboration between big business in Belgium, the Catholic 
Church and the Belgium government. The economic exploitation of the Congo 
continued, even though less violent. “Citizens” were forced to spend at least 60 days a 
year doing public construction. During the war effort of the Second World War, this 
was increased to 120 days. Forced into unpaid labour, Congolese suffered from 
starvation (they did not have time to grow enough food for themselves) and died from 
hardships and maltreatment. Belgium Congo also had laws institutionalising racist 
regulations, restricting the movement of Africans and preventing them from owning 
land. Due to its exploitation of the Congo, Belgium never went into debt during the 
World Wars. The entire Belgian war effort was funded by Congolese profits. The 
political system of the colony consisted out of local chiefs in the Congo who were 
charged with meeting the demands of the colonial government (effectively only a 
bureaucracy), which was overseen by the governor-general, the Belgian parliament 
and colonial affairs minister, residing in Belgium. Military force by the Force 
Publique (public force/colonial army) was used to suppress any resistance. 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 26-39). 
 
3.2.3 Independence and the Congo Crisis 
During the 1950’s Belgium slowly began to change its policy on social and political 
repression and by 1957 a university was opened in Leopoldville. Peasants were now 
also allowed to grow cash crops for profit if they so wished. With the decolonisation 
of French Equatorial Africa, Uganda and Sudan, Belgium was under pressure to 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
37 
 
relinquish its hold on the Congo. In January 1959 riots broke out alongside attacks on 
Europeans and European property. During 1959 and 1960 Belgian authority was in 
general decline especially in the rural areas. Unable to keep control of the vast Congo 
territory and with building international pressure as well as an incoherent policy 
direction, Belgium declared the granting of independence to the Congo in February 
1959. By 1960 the Congo received its full independence (Freund, 1998:198-199). 
 
The Belgium government had however not prepared the African population for 
governing independently. During colonialism Africans could not rise higher than 
clerks, in the administration. By the 1960 independence, even though the literacy rate 
was the highest in Africa due to Catholic schools there were no more than a few 
hundred people in the entire country with a secondary education. It must also be noted 
that the education system was academically limited, as the missionaries who operated 
the schools were in close alliance with the colonial power and real upliftment or 
enlightenment of the labour population was not desired (Coleman & Ngokwey, 
1983:306).  
 
The political elite of the Congo lacked education, wealth and administrative know-
how. In the years after independence political and economic chaos erupted as could 
have been expected. This time of confusion after independence is known as the Congo 
Crisis. After the assassination of the first elected post-colonial president, Patrice 
Lumumba, the First Republic ended with a coup by Mobutu Sese Seko. He became 
the head of government and state on 4 November 1965. In 1967
5
 he formed the 
Movement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR) (The Popular Movement of the 
Revolution) and effectively created a single party state (Coleman & Ngokwey, 
1983:307; MacGaffey, 1991:27). We will now look at the development trajectory 
followed by the DRC after the Congo Crisis. 
 
3.3 The Post-colonial Development Trajectory 
In the Chazan-framework there is no definite fixed timeline for when countries 
entered and exited certain phases of development or change (Chazan, Lewis, 
Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman, 1999:46-68). In the case of the DRC these phases 
                                                 
5
 Some sources give the date of the creation of the MPR as 1966 (Clark, 1998:110). 
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roughly fall into three decades. The concentration of state power, phase one, falls into 
the last years of the 1960’s after Mobutu took power and continues until the economic 
woes of the late 1970’s. Phase two, the elaboration of state power, falls into the last 
years of the 1970’s and continues until the late 1990s. This is the phase up and until 
Mobutu began to experience serious effective local opposition. The reconsideration of 
state power, phase three, is from 1990/1991 onwards, and sees the state in a very 
weak position with Mobutu’s power waning rapidly (Reno, 2006:43). 
 
We will now look at the historic events during each of these phases. After the 
discussion on each phase, the paper will look at the governance found in each phase 
and analyse development based on political, economic and social values. 
  
3.3.1 Phase One, 1965-1979, the Concentration of State Power 
Phase one according to Chazan et al (1999) sees the state begin the process of 
centralisation. The liberation movement that led the country into independence 
becomes convinced that it alone has the right to rule and that consolidation and 
centralisation of power is the best alternative to democracy. Ethnicity in phase one 
gains importance as the new elites are often from one ethnic group, granting this 
group disproportionate benefits in power and in wealth. The state begins to expand in 
phase one, and also creates parastatals to dominate the economy. The governing party 
becomes synonymous with the state over time, completely blurring the lines of where 
the party ends and where the state begins. Any opposition groups that prove to be 
troublesome in this time are removed by means of force. For this reason both the 
army, paramilitary forces and the police are enlarged.   
 
The DRC
6
 reached independence with 16 indigenous university graduates (Reno, 
2006:45). Nonetheless, when it received its independence in 1960, it was seen as the 
second most industrialised country in Africa. However the civil war that broke out 
and lasted until 1967 destroyed much of the administrative, institutional and legal 
structures of the country whilst also ruining the economy (Fairhead, 1992:17). Order 
                                                 
6
 The names Congo, Congo Free State, Belgian Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zaire 
are used as applicable to the timeframe referred to by the context in which these names are used. A 
clear explanation of the names is given in footnote 3 on page 31. To simplify it can be accepted that all 
of these names refer to the same geographical territory, but under different governments at different 
times.  
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was restored after intervention by Belgium, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR), the United States of America (US) and the United Nations (UN). Direct 
foreign involvement is also suspected in the rise of Mobutu and the assassination of 
Lumumba. After creating a one party state in 1966, the name of the once army chief, 
Mobutu Sese Seko, became synonymous with the Zairian state (Clark, 1998:110). In 
1971 he showed his power by unilaterally changing the country’s name to Zaire. 
Mobutu would turn his post as president into a permanent position, in time becoming 
Africa’s longest standing presidential monarch (Coleman & Ngokwey, 1983:306; 
Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:141). Nonetheless, Mobutu came to power with a strong 
popular mandate. He enjoyed both the backing of the international community, who 
felt that a strong man could protect western business better than a weak democracy, as 
well as the Zaire’s population who wanted stability and peace (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 
2002:145-146). 
 
The early Zairian state could best be described as following an absolutist or 
corporatist model. A corporatist state is one that co-opts social groups, especially 
capital and labour. In Zaire’s case it was large international mining corporations. The 
early Zairian state had clear patrimonial tendencies, and would in time evolve into a 
pure patrimonial state. A patrimonial state is similar to an absolutist state, which 
directs its attention to the state project of increasing control over its territory and 
people. Patrimonialism also pacifies diverse interest groups and it allows for the 
coordination of various clashing power brokers by buying them off. In a patrimonial 
state even though it is primarily concerned with extending its power, the ruler 
mobilises state resources and power for personal gain (Clark, 1998:111-112; Reno, 
2006:47). 
 
Mobutu’s regime began as a military dictatorship with the whole of the army’s high 
command as part of the governing junta. This was the closest Zaire would get to 
“democracy” for the next quarter of a century and it would not last for long 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:141). During the 1970’s Mobutu centralised power on 
himself to such an extent that it even surpassed the centralised colonial system. He 
removed local authorities of almost all their power, he encouraged his own personal 
“cult”, referred to as Mobutuism and created a state party, the MPR (the Popular 
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Movement of the Revolution) with compulsory membership, removing the divide 
between government and state (Clark, 1998:112; Coleman & Ngokwey, 1983:307). 
 
Mobutu launched a process of unification, pacification and stabilisation. The new 
regime showed resilience by publically hanging enemies and limiting the power of 
Belgian industrial and financial companies. It followed centralisation, and 
concentration of power with the dissolution of parliament and suppression of the 
opposition. These events fall into the processes of impedance and facilitation as 
mentioned by Chazan et al (1999:47). Impedance sees the government weaken 
participatory institutions, whilst facilitation sees the strengthening and enlarging of 
bureaucratic structures. Mobutu also centralised all decision making power on himself 
as the president, he abolished the post of the prime minister and amended the 
constitution to legalise all the changes (Clark, 1998:112; Coleman & Ngokwey, 
1983:307). The new Zairian constitution declared that “the president of the MPR is by 
right the leader of Zaire, he has full powers. He is in charge of the MPR, the Political 
Bureau, the Executive Council, the Judicial Council, and the Legislative Council. He 
appoints and dismisses Regional Commissioners, he is Supreme Commander, and 
appoints and dismisses officers of the armed forces and the executive level of public 
servants of the administration” (Coleman & Ngokwey, 1983:308).  
 
With the party now as the only organ of state, all movements; women, labour and 
youth organisations were absorbed into the party. Only the Catholic Church remained 
somewhat autonomous. A ban was however put on all Christian names as they were 
declared to be foreign and banned alongside Western suits, ties, Western dresses and 
the wearing of trousers by women (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:172-173). 
 
Mobutu was an autocrat in the purest form of the word. He could do whatever his 
heart desired. He used his newly accumulated wealth and power to suppress his 
opposition and terrify his subordinates. And when he felt it was needed, violent force 
was used at alarming regularity. Corruption, assassination, extrajudicial executions 
(murders), massacres of entire villages and unarmed civilians and banishment to 
prison colonies kept opposition forces in the country under control. Until 1980 it was 
impossible to imagine a local opposition to his regime and all resistance had to 
operate internationally. By 1978 the international media referred to Zaire as a 
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“kleptocracy”. A state in which the elite are only interested in accumulating as much 
wealth for themselves as possible, without looking after the needs of majority 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:172-173).  
 
The early Zairian state did nonetheless have its achievements. It was able to create 
and maintain peace in Africa’s first failed state. It also reintroduced rational 
economics, making use of economists and economic specialists (Clark, 1998:111). In 
fact, Mobutu was seen as a relatively successful state builder by the West during the 
1960’s and 1970’s even though he was known to be an undemocratic dictator. Having 
ended the secessionist violence that tore the country apart after independence, 
Mobutu’s absolutism was thought to be a useful tool of state building. For this reason 
he even enjoyed the express support of the US. Zaire was seen as an example of rapid 
modernisation. Mobutu was sympathetically called the Caesar of Africa
7
 (Clark, 
1998:112). After Mobutu took power, the economy flourished for a few years due to 
high commodity prices on the international market. In 1974 copper prices, one of 
Zaire’s main exports, collapsed. This caused Zaire to default on its debt for the first 
time in 1975 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:145-152). 
 
A major characteristic of Mobutu’s regime was his network of supporters around him. 
It mostly consisted out of relatives of the dictator, members of his ethnic group and 
individuals who had proven their loyalty to him. This class first began to grow in 
strength when Mobutu passed the Bakajika Law of 1966 by which the Zairian state 
established its rights to all land and mineral rights in the country. He also played 
Belgian and other international interests against each other to increase his regime’s 
bargaining power against that of foreign capital. In 1967 the largest copper mining 
company was nationalised and renamed Gécamines. In 1973 the diamond mining 
company Miba was nationalised. Both Miba and Gécamines were then heavily taxed.  
 
Additionally in 1973 the policy of Zairianisation was started. It consisted of the 
confiscation of foreign medium and small enterprises for the benefit of the political 
elite with the stated intent of benefiting the people of Zaire (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 
                                                 
7
 This is a reference to Augustus Caesar (born Octavian, adopted by Julius Caesar) the first accepted 
autocratic ruler of the ancient Roman Empire who ended the Roman Republic and set it on the course 
of empire. He is seen as having been a very effective ruler whilst being completely autocratic.  
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2002:145-152). These actions amongst others such as nationalisation for private gain, 
inflated salaries, embezzled funds and exorbitant expense accounts all helped to 
enrich the new state bourgeoisie that formed around Mobutu (Nest, Kisangani & 
Grignon, 2006:18; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:145-152). Between 1960 and 1975 
Gécamines generated between 50 and 80 per cent of state revenue. When copper 
prices fell in the mid 1970’s, state employees were intermittently paid lower salaries; 
this was the first sign of decay that would become evident in the1980’s (Nest et al, 
2006:18). 
 
Mobutu used the riches of the country to reward and punish those he saw fit. The most 
lucrative way of being rewarded was by being instated as some kind of government 
official. Mobutu saw the country as his own property. When he travelled abroad he 
would always be accompanied by either one of the state companies’ managing 
directors or by the governor of the central bank. These individuals were expected to 
draw money from government and parastatal accounts to cover all of Mobutu’s 
personal expenses. At the start of the 1970’s the Zairian bureaucracy, though far from 
efficient, still acted along rational bureaucratic lines (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:145-
152). By the end of the 1970’s the “rationality” of the bureaucracy had begun to wear 
off, and rather became redundant in many ways with unnecessary posts and red tape. 
The number of bureaucratic employees increased rapidly throughout 1970 and was a 
big drain on public funds by the end of the decade especially after the fall of copper 
prices in the mid 1970’s (Clark, 1998:112). 
 
Due to Zairianisation agricultural output and government revenues were put under 
further strain. Along with the aforementioned drop in the price of copper, the price of 
petroleum tripled and the cost of industrial imports increased sharply (MacGaffey, 
1991:28). Simultaneously, mineral exports were disrupted by the closing of the 
Benguela railroad due to the Angolan civil war. Thus by late 1975 the Zairian 
economy had plunged into a recession from which it would never emerge. 
Government worsened the situation by taking over large foreign owned companies 
and giving them to politicians in a plan called Radicalisation, but this led to a further 
drop in revenues. In a new plan, Retrocession, the previously confiscated businesses 
were given back to their original owners but with forced political partners. In 1977 
and 1978 copper production was disrupted after the invasion of Shaba. By 1978 
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economic output was 17 per cent lower than in 1974 and imports were half the 1974 
value. Manufacturing was at 40 per cent (dropping to 25 per cent by 1979) capacity 
and inflation at 100 per cent by 1978. Real wages had also dropped sharply and was at 
25 per cent of the 1970 level (MacGaffey, 1991:28). At this time even with the 
economic woes of the country the state in Zaire still seemed terrifyingly strong. It 
would only be by the 1980’s that opposition forces began to realise that the control 
from the centre was in actual fact rather weak (Fairhead, 1992:20). 
 
Mobutu used the military very skilfully to keep control of Zaire for 32 years and it 
definitely contributed to the longevity of his reign which was already suffering from 
economic strains by 1975. He used both military and paramilitary forces in an 
overlapping manner, always very conscious of the danger that these might hold, 
having had himself come to power through a military coup. Mobutu ensured that the 
elite units were under the command of collaborators. These were often either directly 
related to him by blood or by marriage or by belonging to the Ngbandi ethnic group 
which the president was from. Although the military would lose its power in time, it 
was at first heavily relied on to suppress dissent and intimidate the general population 
through either shows of strength or at times murderous force. (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 
2002:153-154). 
 
Chazan-framework Summary: In summary it is clear that the Mobutu regime of the 
1960’s and 1970’s led Zaire on a development trajectory almost perfectly described in 
the Chazan-framework (Chazan et al, 1999: 46-68). Under Mobutu the political power 
in the state was concentrated as never before. Mobutu’s political party was not a 
traditional liberation movement, but it did see itself as the wager of the revolution of 
independence, “saving” the country from the Congo Crisis and later from foreign 
capital. The right of the MPR party to rule without any opposition was 
constitutionalised, clearly showing the belief that only the “liberation movement” had 
the right to govern. Ethnicity grew in importance as the members of the Ngbandi 
ethnic group were favoured by the powerful president. The state was enlarged to 
accommodate all the needs of those close to the president and his ruling elite. 
Parastatals were also created by means of nationalising the assets of foreign investors. 
And lastly, where patrimonialism did not remove opposition forces, brute force was 
applied by using the military and police. In the next section we will use the categories 
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of the Worldwide Governance Indicators to give an indication of the state of 
governance. 
 
3.3.2 Governance in Phase One 
Voice and Accountability: At first Mobutu had the support of his people, but for the 
remainder of phase one their criticisms were not allowed. There was no media 
freedom, no freedom of association and definitely no freedom of expression. The 
government was not accountable. 
 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence: The risk of a violent transfer of power in 
this era was low due to effective oppression of opposition forces by the state. 
However this does not mean that the country was stable, since control was kept 
through corruption and force. 
 
Government Effectiveness: The government at the beginning of phase one was 
somewhat effective. However due to subsequent failed economic policies, corruption 
and ineptitude government effectiveness was low. Even though the government 
implemented policies, these mostly failed, such as the policies of Radicalisation and 
Retrocession. The civil service was not independent from government at all, and the 
forced membership of the MPR removed the line between state and government. 
 
Regulatory Quality: Regulatory quality of phase one was low and most policies were 
implemented for the enrichment of the politically connected elite. Government 
involvement in the economy such as through Zairianisation was catastrophic. 
 
Rule of Law: Rule of law was maintained effectively at first, but only to the benefit of 
the political elite. In most cases those who were politically connected operated above 
the law. Thus due to a system operating on a bias based on how politically connected 
one was, the court system and policing lost its integrity. Violence in general was not a 
threat, except if one dared raise opposition to the political elite. 
 
Control of Corruption/Terrorism: Control of corruption was non-existent. It was 
rampant and found in all sectors and levels of government. 
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Governance in Zaire in phase one can be seen as poor due to all the indicators 
indicating a general negative trend. 
 
3.3.3. Development in Phase One  
Political Development 
During phase one there was no free electoral process, no political pluralism and very 
limited political participation, limited to the president and those he favoured through 
patrimonialism. Government functioned only to the extent that the political elite were 
able to accumulate wealth for themselves. Phase one saw some freedom of belief, 
little freedom of expression, almost no associational and organisational rights, 
individual rights were compromised when the political elite saw fit and rule of law 
existed only in the sense that the autocrat could enforce his decisions. Transparency in 
this one party state was low and corruption was increasing steadily. Political 
development as analysed by this research was neutral due to a lack of civil liberties 
and little political rights. Additionally Zaire during phase one can be seen to have 
experienced negative political development due to a lack of political freedom and 
participation which were reduced throughout the phase. Nonetheless with 
independence and the creation of a new functioning state political development was 
rather neutral than outright negative. 
 
Economic Development 
The government polices of Zairianisation, Radicalisation, nationalisation and 
Retrocession along with a drop in the price of copper, higher costs of imports and 
interruptions in copper exports left the Zairian economy in a recession by 1978, the 
end of phase one. Zaire had defaulted on its foreign debt and living standards of the 
poor and politically unconnected continued to plummet. In four years (1974-1978) 
economic output had dropped 17 per cent and Zairians were earning 25 per cent 
below the 1970 level in 1978. In real financial terms phase one saw the destruction of 
the Zairian economy. Economic development for the era was clearly negative with 
inflation in 1978 at 100 per cent. (MacGaffey, 1991:28). 
 
Social Development 
During the 1960’s and 1970’s the Zairian society benefited little from the state of the 
country and experienced a drop in living standards, as also seen in the aforementioned 
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drop in real income of 25 per cent between 1970 and 1978. Service delivery was 
almost non-existent, with the state unable and unwilling to provide even basic public 
goods such as economic stability, rule of law and healthcare. On 4 June 1969, students 
were protesting in favour of increased support for academic and social means which 
ended in a government crackdown that saw 60 students killed. In 1971 students at 
Lovanium held a memorial service for their fallen comrades. The gathering ended in 
violence and the students were forced into the military. After these incidents the MPR 
nationalised major Zairian universities causing terrible damage to the functionality of 
these institutions (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:178-179). Compared to other countries, 
even in Africa, the DRC by 1980 was not doing well when one considers the Human 
Development index (HDI) rating for 1980. The HDI for the DRC in 1980 was 0.267 
compared to the sub-Saharan African average of 0.293 and the world average at 0.455 
(UNDP, 2011b). Social development in phase one can thus also be seen as negative, 
since government services became less as government accountability and 
effectiveness dropped in the period. 
 
3.4.1 Phase Two, 1979-1990, the Elaboration of State Power 
Phase two in the Chazan-framework is in many ways an extension of phase one. It 
contains some of the same trends, but often these are happening at a faster rate or on a 
larger scale. Phase two sees the already large state expand even further. This leads to 
an even larger drop in state effectiveness. One central aspect of phase two is the loss 
of state legitimacy. The state has lost the support of the population and control is kept 
through a larger but also often a politically dangerous military and police (Chazan et 
al, 1999:46-68). We now turn to Zaire in phase two. 
 
The change in Zaire from the mid 1970’s to 1980 was one of shocking rapid decay. 
From 1980 onwards there were no more attempts by government to stabilise the 
country’s economy which was going through a major recession. In 1980 a group of 
thirteen parliamentarians dared to demand a multiparty system in an open letter to the 
president. This led to further repression from Mobutu. Even under this new drive to 
maintain power, regional authorities began to slowly regain their power. This was due 
to the fact that the Shaba invasions of 1977 and 1978 had begun to break the myth of 
the absolutist state (Bender, 1978:14; Clark, 1998:113). The Shaba invasions were 
invasions of the Shaba region in Zaire by the Front for the National Liberation of the 
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Congo (FNLC), possibly supported by the Angolan and Cuban governments. In both 
invasions Mobutu had to rely on foreign support to stop the invasions as his own 
military was not able to, revealing weakness. Mobutu’s regime by the early 1980’s 
had seemingly given up on the idea of governing a healthy state, but rather accepted 
that they would keep power through weapons. By doing this the state began to 
consume its own support bases, tightening the grip of poverty on the already starving 
society (Bender, 1978:14-15; Clark, 1998:112-113). 
 
From 1980 onwards the Zairian state did not serve its citizens at all anymore. 
Government departments were utterly redundant and officials often worked with 
fictitious data that they made up. This was due to high levels of corruption and 
inadequacy. After 1980 there were no more cohesive government efforts and no more 
plans for government led development
8
. Rather the political elites preyed on the 
population. Wealth was extracted from the population through the seizure of property 
on the slightest pretext. This meant that phase two was characterised by chronic 
economic insecurity as no one knew when the little they had gathered would be taken 
away. The presidential court also grew ever more bizarre as presidential advisors 
struggled for influence, at times even making us of so called “black magic” 
(traditional witchery) (Clark, 1998:113-115; Reno, 2006:48). 
 
The economy was further devastated through the levying of very high official and 
unofficial taxes. Imports were often taxed more than the actual price of the product. 
Even for individuals traveling, public places such as airports saw the levying of bribes 
on a range of unnecessary “services” (Clark, 1998:113-115). Mobutu did not in any 
way keep to the pretence of a normal society. During the 1980’s when he required 
money, he simply ordered the central bank to print the amount that he wanted. This 
led to inflation of thousands of per cent. The state (Mobutu’s regime) also extracted 
money directly from Gécamines which paid very high official and unofficial taxes. 
During the early Mobutu era the telephone and road networks slowly collapsed. The 
1980’s were no different and nothing was done to relieve the situation. Vehicles, 
railway stock, river boats and ferries also fell into disrepair due to a shortage of spare 
                                                 
8
 There was a plan called the Mobutu Plan (1979-1981) which included ideas for economic 
development, foreign assistance programs and the use of expatriates to improve bureaucratic 
functioning, however it was never seriously considered or implemented and what it achieved was 
quickly sabotaged by the elite’s relentless pursuit of self-interest (MacGaffey, 1991:28). 
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parts and fuel (MacGaffey, 1991:13). The state’s need for extraction became so wide 
spread and desperate, that peasants were even threatened by extraction, having to pay 
bribes or lose their livestock (Clark, 1998:116-117,119). 
 
Unlike the East Asian states however, where corruption occurred alongside growth 
even though it hurt the economy in the short term, Mobutu was not powerful enough 
to allow a similar process to work in Zaire. Consequently when the country began to 
collapse in the 1980’s Mobutu and his associates had to find new ways of keeping 
power (Reno, 2006:49). Thus power was maintained during the 1980’s through the 
use of the military and paramilitary forces. The presidential guard numbered 12 000, 
the civilian guard 14 000 and the military was between 120 000 and 170 000 strong 
(Clark, 1998:122). With the government staying in power but unable to maintain any 
form of legitimate rule of law, corruption spread throughout all sectors of 
government. More and more “officials” were granted the right of acting as rent 
seekers as the financial capacity of the state decreased (Reno, 2006:50). By the mid 
1980’s citizens could no longer use the roads that were still operational since it was 
infested by government officials demanding money and goods, more in the way of a 
robbery than bribing (Fairhead, 1992:22). 
 
In real terms the economy was devastated. Debt repayments, even after two defaults 
in the late 1970’s, had to be rescheduled in 1979, 1980, 1981 and in 1983. Debt 
service rose from 11 per cent of government expenditure in 1982, to an enormous 56 
per cent in 1985. The country had a debt load of US$8.5 billion by 1989 (Fairhead, 
1992:18). At the start of Zaire’s economic decline, in 1978, the Paris Club and 
International Monetary Fund placed its major financial organs under their tutelage. A 
distinguished German banker, Erwin Blumenthal, was appointed to manage the 
central bank and teams of French and Belgian experts took over control of the 
Ministry of Finance and Customs Agency. This was based on the idea that the Zairian 
economy was floundering due to some technical error. However it became evident 
that this was not the case. Between 50 per cent and 75 per cent of foreign exchange 
continued to elude both Blumenthal and the French/Belgian teams. There was not a 
lack of technical skills, but rather there was a problem with what these skills were 
used for. Mobutu and his kleptocracy were determined to protect their interests 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:152). 
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One of the worst effects of the 1970’s economic down turn was the effect it had on the 
wages to price ratio. In 1983, salaries of public servants were nominally seven times 
higher than it was in 1975. But in actual real terms they were at lower than one-fifth 
of the 1975 level. If one uses 1969 as a fixed point, prices were 46 times higher in 
1979 and by 1986 they were 113 times higher than in 1969. Even the civil servants 
were struggling by 1984. The average salary of a civil servant was 750 Z, whilst the 
average monthly food expenditure for a family of six amounted to 3037 Z 
(MacGaffey, 1991:13). 
 
Chazan-framework Summary: State expansion during phase two was not really 
present in the traditional sense. The state did not create many new institutions. What it 
however did do was empower individuals to increasingly act as rent seekers in the 
name of the state for their own gain by expanding the bureaucracy if the state. This 
can be seen as a form of state expansion. Phase two saw the end of any government 
effectiveness. Even the government’s ability to extract for itself was reduced due to 
the dismal economic state of 1980’s Zaire. Zaire in the 1980’s was however still at the 
mercy of the MPR which along with its president used the country, government 
institutions and parastatals such as Gécamines for personal enrichment. The country 
was bankrupt and unable to support the patrimonial system favoured by Mobutu’s 
regime. Yet Mobutu and his government continued to act in such a way as to clearly 
show that they did not have the interest of their subjects at heart. Those who wanted 
wealth and power had no alternative than to enter the intrigues of the presidential 
court. Through exorbitant corruption, the use of excessive violence, the abuse of 
public offices and utter mismanagement, Mobutu’s regime and the state lost most of 
its legitimacy. Zaire in the 1980’s clearly followed the trajectory described by the 
Chazan-framework in phase two even though it at times even acted more corrupt than 
what can be expected in phase two.  
 
3.4.2 Governance in Phase Two 
Voice and Accountability: The Zairian government lost any sense of accountability in 
phase two. Some citizens were by now able to exercise some freedom of association 
in rural areas, but this was only due to the first sign of government collapse. 
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Political Stability and Absence of Violence: The 1980’s began to see the first public 
signs of opposition to Mobutu. Due to political power being kept through the use of 
soldiers, violence and corruption, the likelihood of a non-democratic regime change 
was high. That is if a regime change was to occur. Violence was also used in this era 
to maintain order. At times massacres of unarmed civilian were orchestrated to quell 
opposition (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:173). 
 
Government Effectiveness: The 1980’s saw the end of government effectiveness. This 
process was even resilient to the support provided by institutions such as the 
International Monetary fund and the Paris Club. 
 
Regulatory Quality: Regulatory quality was near non-existent and there were nearly 
not any policies that bettered the private sector environment. 
 
Rule of Law: Citizens’ property rights were not respected and instead of guarding 
them the government were the ones who violated them through expropriations. 
Policing was used as a way of intimidating the population, whilst the office/post of 
police officer was used as a means to personal self-enrichment (through bribes for 
example) by many who were appointed to the post. 
 
Control of Corruption/Terrorism 
By the 1980’s, the interests of the elite had taken over the state. Corruption was 
rampant and blatant. 
  
Governance in Zaire in phase two was poor as is evident from the indicators. 
 
3.4.3. Development in Phase Two 
Political Development 
Political development was already showing negative trends in phase one. In phase two 
this only accelerated. There still was no electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, and the functioning of government was limited to keeping power 
through force and rent taking. Political rights were as good as non-existent. Civil 
liberties were not promoted or protected by the state in the 1980’s, rather when people 
expressed opposition sentiment it resulted in repression, as in the case of the thirteen 
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parliamentarians. With both civil liberties and political rights deteriorating during the 
1980’s, political development was negative. 
 
Economic Development 
Salaries in real terms lost their value in the 1980’s. Government debt increased and 
the economic recession took on greater proportions. Debt also had to be rescheduled 
continuously and took up more than 50 per cent of government expenditure. 
Compared to the 1970’s and the 1960’s economic development in the 1980’s was 
negative and the economy benefited increasingly less people. 
 
Social Development 
The 1980’s saw the complete collapse of government services. Quality of life was 
reduced due to lower salaries and lower living standards for the majority of citizens. 
With the state completely incapable of delivering services, social development in the 
1980’s saw a clear decline. This is also reflected in the HDI rating for the Zaire. 
Between 1980 and 1990, the Zaire’s HDI fell from 0.267 to 0.261 (UNDP, 2011b). 
 
3.5.1 Phase Three, 1990-, the Reconsideration of State Power 
By 1990, the state of Zaire had deteriorated on all levels and not even the autocrat 
Mobutu was able to deny this. He was forced to accept the readmission of multiparty 
democracy as an option. In 1991 a Sovereign National Council was called to 
determine the future of the country. Mobutu’s power by 1990 was much less than 
many people assumed. He had had to spend increasingly more power and money on 
different sources to keep control of “his” country (Clark, 1998:113; Reno, 2006:50). 
The Zairian state had become highly fragmented with a loss of control over some 
areas and fragmented instruments of physical coercion across the rest of the country. 
The state experienced an inability to sustain a physical presence in its own territory 
and struggled to keep allegiances (Kaldor, 1999:52). 
 
The process of democratisation was nonetheless prolonged by Mobutu who bought 
opposition leaders by giving them extraction rights or plainly giving them sums of 
money. The fact that the opposition leaders often accepted these bribes shows the 
extent of the corruption of by and large all the political elites in Zaire. It must also be 
mentioned that many of these “opposition leaders” were in fact old ministers and 
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prime ministers of Mobutu’s regime who now founded opposition parties not based 
on any kind of popular support (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:186). Mobutu might not have 
been as powerful anymore, but he was an experienced statesman and knew how to 
play different interests off against one another. 
 
The Sovereign National Council (SNC) elected a prime minister, Tshisekedi. Mobutu 
however named his own prime minister, which led to the creation of a dual 
government. Mobutu also ordered his military to prevent the new ‘democratic’ 
ministers from entering their offices for work. Thousands of people protested the 
failure of the SNC under the leadership of catholic priests, leaving churches with 
bibles in one hand and candles in the other. Mobutu ordered his troops to open fire 
and killed 30 protestors. The chaos that came from the “dual” government system led 
to the state basically becoming non-existent by the spring of 1994 (Clark, 1998:113-
114; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:189; Reno, 2006:51). In 1995 there had been no 
improvement to the lives of citizens. In the city of Kikwit, 250 miles from Kinshasa, 
the 400 000 citizens still lived without electricity, sewage or running water. The 
judicial system had also completely collapsed and prisoners died by the hundreds 
from starvation as they awaited trial (Clark, 1998:116).The social safety between 
1993 and 1994 was non-existent and citizens formed protection groups in an attempt 
to protect them from local military forces. Most crimes in this era went completely 
unpunished, except in the case of political crimes which were severely punished 
(Clark, 1998:117). 
 
State property was sold off in phase three at such an alarming rate that there very soon 
was almost no state property left. State enterprises were declared unprofitable and 
then often bought by the very official who declared it to be unprofitable. By 1994 
Mobutu had accumulated a personal fortune of between US$5billion and US$8billion 
(Clark, 1998:118). The Gross Domestic Product of Zaire declined by 7.2 per cent in 
1991, 12,3 per cent in 1992 and 10,4 per cent in 1993. Copper exports between 1990 
and 1994 also fell by 90 per cent
9
 with inflation going higher than 20 000 per cent 
(Clark, 1998:112). From the 1980’s onward the economy had also slowly begun to go 
informal. This was an attempt to avoid the rent seeking elites. By 1990 this meant that 
                                                 
9
 The fall in copper exports was due to a cave in at Kamoto mine, the biggest mine operated by 
Gécamines (Nest et al, 2006:19). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
53 
 
the state was receiving continuously less taxes from transactions leading to much 
reduced revenues (Reno, 2006:50). It is however this informal and “illegal” economy 
that supported millions of Zairians and supports millions of Congolese during times in 
which the formal economy is and was very hard to navigate (Nest et al, 2006:17). 
 
By 1997 Mobutu, who had been diagnosed with prostate cancer in 1994, was forced 
from power. He left Zaire with the state basically gone and many regions being all but 
autonomous (Clark, 1998:124). Mobutu was unable to repel his opposition when he 
lost much international support after the end of the Cold War and the Angolan war. 
Mobutu was followed by Laurent Kabila. He had led the Alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire with Rwandan and Ugandan support against 
Mobutu from 1996, winning the country in 1997 (Montague, 2002:109). The DRC 
can currently be seen as a failed state (Reno, 2006:43). Even the old revenue sources 
of Mobutu’s government have not been able to recover after the chaos of the 1990’s. 
By 2000 Gécamines (copper) and Miba (mostly diamonds) combined only contributed 
three per cent to government revenues, compared to 75 per cent from taxes and 
customs duties (Nest et al, 2006:38). 
 
The fall of Mobutu was ultimately the culmination of many factors. Mobutu ended 
one party rule under international pressure in April 1990 and promised democratic 
reforms. Later the year he however ordered the massacre of a 100 students who were 
protesting against his regime at the University of Lubumbashi. Between 1990 and 
1993 he became unable to pay his soldiers and civil service. The unpaid soldiers 
engaged in widespread looting of private property in retaliation. Along with these 
events and his undermining of the SNC, Mobutu, his regime and his military lost what 
little legitimacy they had left. Control across the country was slowly lost to warlords, 
who were left unchallenged as long as they did not openly challenge Mobutu (Nest et 
al, 2006:18-24; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:196-198).  
 
After the genocide in Rwanda many génocidaires (committers of genocide) fled 
possible Tutsi revenge and were allowed to remain in Zaire. From camps in Zaire 
these génocidaires launched attacks into Rwanda. In 1996 the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) invaded Zaire to capture and kill the génocidaires. The Ugandan’s 
Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) joined the RPF. The Ugandan president wanted to see 
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Mobutu overthrown since Mobutu had allowed Ugandan opposition forces to launch 
attacks against the UPDF from Zaire. The RPF and the UPDF together organised the 
Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL). The 
Angolan government also supported the effort against Mobutu to avenge him having 
allowed safety to the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola 
(UNITA) in his territory whilst opposing the Angolan government. Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila was chosen to lead the AFDL. The AFDL met little resistance in its campaign 
of eight months to claim Kinshasa. The Zairian army had by now mostly deserted. 
The AFDL reached Kinshasa on 17 May 1997. Mobutu fled the capital before the 
AFDL arrived and died in exile in Morocco in September. Kabila declared himself 
president and renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Nest et al, 
2006:18-24; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:224-225). 
 
Chazan-framework Summary: Mobutu’s regime and the state in Zaire in general lost 
the trust of the population. The government by the 1990’s in Zaire was already failing 
and could not expand further. However public offices had lost legitimacy alongside 
the state. With the regime increasingly being seen as illegitimate and fraudulent (as it 
clearly showed by disregarding the SNC) violence increased across the country. With 
resources dwindling, the government became unable to limit violence and opposition. 
It could no longer maintain any form of peace. The economy had also failed 
completely by 1994. The Zairian elite had reduced the state to such an extent that it 
could no longer continue to exist in any real form. Kabila inherited the idea of a state, 
but the DRC has yet to show that it has recovered from its second collapse.  
 
3.5.2 Governance in Phase Three 
The WGI rates the six governance indicators on a score between -2.5 and +2.5. A 
score of -2.5 is very poor governance and a score of +2.5 is very good governance. 
The six indicators for 1996 rate as follows: 
 
Voice and Accountability   : -1.63 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence : -1.87 
Government Effectiveness   : -1.54 
Regulatory Quality    : -2.33 
Rule of Law     : -2.31 
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Control of Corruption/Terrorism  : -2.49 
 
These figures show that Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence and Government Effectiveness rated very poorly. Regulatory Quality, Rule 
of Law and Control of Corruption/Terrorism rated exceptionally poor. The WGI also 
provide a percentage indicating the standing of the country compared to others. If the 
percentage is zero, the country is the worst in the world (or equally terrible as other 
that rate the worst with it). If the percentage is 100, the country is the best in the world 
for that indicator. Voice and Accountability, and Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence score 6.2 per cent and 5.8 per cent respectively. This shows that the country 
was amongst the worst in the world for these indicators. Nonetheless, Government 
Effectiveness scores a dismal 1.5 per cent and Regulatory Quality 2 per cent. Rule of 
Law and Control of Corruption/Terrorism both score zero per cent, meaning these 
indicators are the worst in the world. Out of these figures it is clear that governance in 
Zaire was poor by the end of phase three, in fact by 1996 the country was one of the 
worst governed states on Earth (World Bank Group, 2011). 
 
3.5.3. Development in Phase Three 
Political Development 
The Freedom House, Freedom in the World survey, rates countries based on political 
right and civil liberties. Each country is then assigned a score based on certain 
indicators for the variables. Countries with scores of between 1.0 and 2.5 are rated as 
“Free”, between 3.0 and 5.0 as “Partly Free” and those between 5.5 and 7.0 as “Not 
Free”. Based on the data thus far presented this research would rate Zaire in the early 
1990’s as definitely not free, with once more negative political development. 
Protesters were killed, the opposition was bought and demands for democracy were 
ignored. Freedom house rate the DRC in 2001 as “Not Free”, with Political Rights 
receiving the worst possible rating of 7. Civil liberties received a 6. This rating clearly 
supports the trajectory tracked by the research in Zaire/DRC up to this time (Freedom 
House, 2010; Freedom House, 2002b; Puddington, 2011:30). 
 
Economic Development 
Economic development during the 1990’s was negative. The GDP of the country 
between 1991 and 1993 fell on average by 9.97 per cent. Copper exports were down, 
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and the informal, non-taxed economy grew. Government revenues were down and 
control of the economy in any formal way completely collapsed.   
 
Social Development 
Social development for this era clearly went into the negative. The Human 
Development Index (HDI) rating fell throughout the 1990’s. Zero is the lowest and 
represents very low social development, with 1 being the highest showing strong 
social (human) development. In 1990 the DRC received a rating of 0.261. This 
already low rating fell to 0.201 in 2000 (UNDP, 2011b). This indicates, as argued by 
the research, negative social development in the DRC during phase three. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
It is not the aim of this chapter to make any direct correlations between governance 
and development. This chapter has however shown that Zaire clearly followed the 
development trajectory as presented in the Chazan-framework. In phase one, two and 
three governance was poor. By 1990 there was almost no form of effective 
governance left. The political development of the country followed the same path as 
governance and seemingly became worse alongside it. At the same time both 
economic and social development, which had almost looked promising at the end of 
the Congo crisis first stalled and then began to decline. Negative economic and social 
development was already visible in phase one, and progressively deteriorated.  
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Chapter 4: State Development and Governance in Botswana 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Botswana is seen as one of the few and possibly the most promising success stories in 
state development in Africa. Botswana today has a free and open democracy with 
internationally recognised elections. Its economy is seen as stable, growing between 4 
and 6 per cent every year since independence; and even with its vast natural wealth, 
corruption is thought to be low (Englebert, 2000:10). The country is professionally 
managed by highly educated and competent bureaucrats (Shale, 2009:57). Botswana 
at a glance seems to be visibly different from the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC). This chapter will evaluate Botswana’s state development; and if it has been 
successful, it is important to understand what role governance had in the trajectory 
followed by Botswana. Thus the question that will be asked in this chapter is, how can 
Botswana’s economic, political and social successes be accounted for and how does it 
contrast with the DRC? 
 
This chapter will resemble the outline of chapter three. It will begin by giving an 
overview of the pre-colonial and colonial history of Botswana. Secondly the chapter 
will look at three development phases of the Chazan-framework as applied to 
Botswana. Botswana will however be shown to have followed a different path than 
the DRC, and for this reason it does not fit into the Chazan-framework, since the 
framework is based on a trajectory of state development of an unsuccessful state 
(negative state development). Nonetheless the ways in which it differs from the 
Chazan-framework, will give us insight into what is different in the case of Botswana. 
Due to the lack of three clear phases as described by Chazan et al, this research has 
identified three phases in Botswana development taken from academic literature. 
These phases are roughly based on the five elections held in Botswana between 1965 
and 1989. 
 
4.2 Pre-colonial and Colonial Botswana 
Botswana is situated on an area the size of France, between the states of South Africa 
to the south, Namibia to the west, Zambia to the north and Zimbabwe to the east. The 
dominant Tswana population moved into the area in the early eighteenth century. The 
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Tswana were predominantly cattle herders, living in a country that was not naturally 
favourable to agriculture, with only four per cent of the Botswana territory being 
usable for cultivation (Parson, 1981:236; Seidler, 2010:3). The pre-colonial elite 
consisted out of the major cattle owners which comprised the aristocracy. The 
majority of the population were however peasants who made a living through 
subsistence farming (Parson, 1981:239). The peasants paid tribute to the elite with any 
excess production or by supplying labour and the elite in turn supplied the peasants 
with access to cattle for milk, occasional meat and for ploughing in later years 
(Parson, 1981:239-240). There existed a material bond between the classes based on 
cattle. Land was communally held and rights of usage were universal. The elite only 
controlled the specific allocation of land use. Political and social control “depended 
largely… upon the ownership of cattle and social relations of production in 
agriculture which depended on cattle” (Parson, 1981:240). 
 
In 1885 the Bechuanaland Protectorate was proclaimed by Britain. The protectorate 
was created after Britain became increasingly concerned with the risk of Transvaal 
and/or German occupation of the Bechuanaland territory. General Sir Charles Warren 
had persuaded the three most important chiefs of the Tswana to accept British 
protection in 1876. The Tswana elite chose “colonisation over the threat of (possible) 
institutional extinction” by the Transvaal republic or the German colonisers to the 
west (Englebert, 2000:13-14; Fawcus, 2000:19). Botswana would remain a British 
protectorate from 1885 until independence 30 September 1966 (Shale, 2009:58). 
 
During the colonial era, British imperial control and influence in the Bechuanaland 
area remained very low. The European population numbered as low as one per cent at 
its height, and control was indirect. This meant that Tswana political structures were 
left mostly intact. Britain also did not invest much in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 
as they saw it as being economically unviable (Seidler, 2010:3). Britain rather than 
truly annex the Bechuanaland territory used indirect governance with as little as 
possible administration and settlement. From 1885-1895 the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate was governed from Vryburg, and from Mafikeng, in South Africa, 
between 1895 and 1966. The fact that neither of these administrative centres were in 
Botswana shows a clear lack of interest in Bechuanaland on the part of Britain. Until 
independence, Botswana never had a local capital nor a resident governor (Narayana, 
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Siphambe, Akinkugbe & Sentsho, 2005:19). Nonetheless the High Commissioner of 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate was given wide ranging executive and legislative 
powers by an Order of Council on the 9
th
 of May 1891. He was however instructed to 
confine law making to whites only, as far as possible (Fawcus, 2000:22-24).  
 
Britain’s lack of investment in Bechuanaland was in part due to the fact that the 
territory had seemingly little in natural resources, and it had a large sparsely populated 
terrain. This meant that governing the territory directly would be costly with very 
little income generated in return (Fawcus, 2000:19). Britain was also reluctant to 
develop an area claimed by the Union of South Africa. The Union of South Africa had 
laid claim to the territory ever since the passing of the Act of Union in 1910 (Fawcus, 
2000:19). There is however an interesting side story of Britain trying to claim the 
territory on a more permanent base. In July 1894 an order in Council was made which 
gave the Colonial Secretary the right to place the Bechuanaland Protectorate under the 
authority and jurisdiction of the British South Africa Company. Cecil John Rhodes 
tried to enable it immediately, but this caused an outcry from the Batswana (Tswana). 
In the August of 1895 Chiefs Khama III, Bathoen I and Sebele I travelled to England 
to pursue their objections to losing their sovereignty. Colonial Secretary Chamberlain 
at first refused to accept their complaints. This led to the three chiefs touring England 
raising public support with the help of a missionary, W.C. Willoughby. With public 
opinion in favour of the chiefs, Chamberlain was forced to enter into a written 
agreement with the chiefs on 6 November 1894. This agreement essentially gave the 
three chiefs control of their territories with only limited supervision by an agent of the 
crown. In time this level of control was extended de facto to all Tswana chiefs 
(Fawcus, 2000:23-24). 
 
Even with their “new freedom” Britain imposed restrictions on economic activities of 
the people of Bechuanaland. It also imposed some taxes, notably the hut tax, and 
created administrative acts and practices that facilitated the labour recruitment and 
economic integration of Bechuanaland with South Africa (Parson, 1981:239). During 
the colonial period the Batswana elite tuned into a dependent petty bourgeois 
governing class. The cattle link to the peasantry was retained but capital accumulation 
was limited to cattle marketing in South Africa. The elite were bureaucratised and 
used in a supervisory role by Britain. The imposing of taxes on the peasant population 
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with very limited economic opportunities stimulated the acceptance of wage labour 
offers from South Africa and the creation of a system of migrant labour. The social 
situation now saw a cattle owning elite acting as supervisors for Britain with a 
peasantry characterised by short-employment in South Africa with a subsistence 
agricultural base. There was a continued existence of pre-colonial Tswana political 
forms and processes such as chiefs and their control over land allocation (Parson, 
1981:240). The agrarian petty-bourgeoisie and a newly formed educated 
bureaucratically based petty-bourgeoisie together formed the Botswana Democratic 
Party (BDP) which led the country to independence in 1966. The BDP (a party 
strongly marked by the cattle owning elite) were democratically supported by the 
peasants, another sign of pre-colonial social organisation in Botswana surviving into 
the post-colonial era (Parson, 1981:240-241). 
 
The process to independence for Botswana was, compared to other colonial territories, 
better planned than most. During the 1950’s, with local consultation, a process of 
constitution formation was begun in Bechuanaland. The first multi-member 
legislature meeting was held on 20 June 1961 in the High Court building in Lobatse. 
This was one of the first meetings that represented (only meaning physically looked 
like) an independent parliamentary session. From 1961 onwards the creation of 
political parties were encouraged and on 9 March 1965, Seretse Khama became the 
first Prime minister
10
. By October 1965 the Bechuanaland cabinet seemed to be 
mostly acting without British involvement. On 30 September 1966 the newly named 
Botswana became a fully independent state (Fawcus, 2000:55,69,186,196). 
 
British colonialism left Botswana a legacy of political stability. It however also left it 
with very little in terms of economic development. At independence Botswana had 
only 12 kilometres of paved roads, 22 Batswana university graduates (educated in 
South Africa) and 100 secondary school graduates (Seidler, 2010:3). The rest of the 
Botswana economy consisted out of; one abattoir, one meat cannery, one corn mill, 
one malt mill, two textile plants, one leather tannery, one creamery and one bone meal 
and fodder plant. Due to an almost complete lack of local economic production, 
                                                 
10
 Khama was not directly voted into power; the prime minister in Botswana is indirectly elected, 
however it was a popular democratic election that brought him to power (Fawcus, 2000:186). 
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Botswana in 1966 also relied on British grant-in-aid for 50 per cent of its budgetary 
requirements (Naranyana et al, 2005:20). 
 
Botswana, unlike many other African countries had in many ways retained its pre-
colonial form in the modern world. According to Englebert (2000:16), Botswana was 
one of only ten African countries to reach independence as a state in the same form as 
the pre-colonial “state” that existed in the territory of the modern state. In other 
words, it retained its own ‘natural’ sphere of influence. The presidency in Botswana 
after independence was assumed, with the consent of the population, by the pre-
colonial aristocratic families. This made Botswana a modernised “African kingdom” 
based on free and fair democratic values (Englebert, 2000:14). The new political elites 
were the large cattle owners and the educated. The educated class were part of the 
cattle owning class since it was through the wealth of the cattle owners that children 
from aristocratic families received education to form the new educated class. Thus 
both the pre-colonial, colonial and the post-colonial elites were one and the same, 
consisting out of the aristocratic cattle owning class with an historical link to the 
peasant classes (Parson, 1981:241). 
 
4.3 The Post-colonial Development Trajectory 
Due to the fact that Botswana is mostly seen as a successful attempt at state 
development, the Chazan-framework based on a trajectory of negative state 
development cannot be applied directly to the case of Botswana (Chazan, Lewis, 
Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman 1999:46-68). For this reason Botswana does also 
not necessarily have a development trajectory that falls into three phases. After doing 
a review of the literature it was decided to use elections and the time periods between 
and around them as the phases of development in Botswana as these seem to show the 
clearest changes in the state over time. The three phases are: from the first election in 
1965 to the third election in 1974. This is the time period in which according to 
Chazan other African governments often experienced centralisation. In Botswana this 
was the time of the first election dilemma, and the emergence of the first signs of civil 
society (Chazan et al, 1999:46-54; Maundeni, 2005:6-7; Mfundisi, 2005:165). The 
second phase stretches between 1975 and 1989, thus from just after the third election 
until just before the sixth. This period which is a time of increasing corruption and 
negative state development in the Chazan framework, saw the Botswana political 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
62 
 
system mature and civil society strengthen (Chazan et al, 1999:54-65; Maundeni, 
2005:6-7; Mfundisi, 2005:165). The third phase for Botswana is placed between the 
sixth election of 1989 and the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. This is a time in Botswana 
of continued free and fair elections but also with a continuing dominance of the BDP 
(Maundeni, 2005:6-7; Molomo, 2005:32,40).  
 
4.3.1.1 Phase One, 1965-1974 
Botswana by 1965 was a largely homogenous
11
 rural country very reliant on livestock 
for its economic wellbeing. In cruel irony it was in many ways similar to Somalia at 
this time, but it would not long remain this way, Botswana was due to begin its road 
to economic prosperity (Samatar, 1999:xiii-xiv). Homogenous societies are often 
more susceptible to democracy and its population composition aided Botswana in its 
democratic stability (Molutsi & Sebudubudu, 2008:53).The Gross National Product 
per capita at this time was between US$77 and US$80 (Seidler, 2010:4). Some 
sources set the GDP per capita as low as R45 to R65 (Samatar, 1999:63). Foreign 
reserves in 1966 were at zero. It was one of the poorest countries in the world. The 
country had primary education enrolment of 62 833 in 1966. In the same year the 
secondary school enrolment was 1036. For a country with a population of more than 
550 000 at the time, this was, though an improvement from colonial times, rather low 
(Leith, 2005:13; Samatar, 1999:3). In all a very bleak future seemed to be set out for 
Botswana. 
 
Seretse Khama, a chieftain heir, had united the Tswana tribes in the 1960’s under the 
BDP. He was not only the heir of the largest tribe, but also the largest cattle owner
12
. 
Khama would be president of Botswana from independence in 1966 until his death in 
1980 (Robinson, 2009:1). Even though he was married to a white woman and had 
been forced to denounce his chieftaincy by Britain as a result, he still represented a 
clear continuity with the past (Robinson, 2009:10). The BDP included most of the 
pre-colonial chieftain families creating a unity between the old and new structures of 
government after independence (Samatar, 1999:6-7). By incorporating the old forms 
of power and the newly educated, Botswana’s post-colonial government had a united 
                                                 
11
 There are other ethnic groups in Botswana but the vast majority of the population falls into the 
Tswana group. 
12
Seretse Khama was the grandson of Chief Khama III who had travelled to Britain to protest 
Bechuanaland’s cession to the British South African Company (Robinson, 2009:2). 
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and stable leadership with little elite competition. The old elite were cattle owners and 
thus to some extent businessmen. In 1965 the BDP won a resounding majority of the 
vote, gathering 81 per cent of all ballots cast in the general election (Seidler, 2010:22). 
Under a united BDP the Botswana elite were able to collectively strive for 
development. The ‘new’ legitimate, stable and united leadership was foremost in 
developing Botswana (Samatar, 1999:8-9). 
 
Unlike other African countries that followed Africanisation
13
 which led to economic 
stagnation and decline, Botswana immediately began to implement a culture of 
professionalism based on merit. This is even more noteworthy due to the fact that as 
late as 1964, 75 per cent of the senior and middle positions in the public service were 
still filled by expatriates. This figure would not have changed much by 1966 (Seidler, 
2010:25). Post-1966 skilled foreigners were used whilst the government trained a 
local bureaucracy. Standards were not lowered in an attempt to localise skills. The 
new Botswana bureaucracy was built on three values: One, only skilled employees 
were hired, and only success could see one receive a promotion or higher salary. Two, 
the bureaucracy was made accountable to the political leaders, reinforcing 
professionalism; and three, the bureaucracy was given autonomy so as to create 
professional isolation, leading to internal coherence, discipline and stronger integrity 
(Samatar, 1999:10-11). Botswana’s professionalism in governance goes further. 
Politicians and bureaucrats were given clear divisions of labour and power. Instead of 
becoming one unit, they cooperated as two separate entities. Government and state 
remained separate thereby also ensuring a separation between the dominant party and 
the state (Samatar, 1999:9-11).  
 
Discipline and integrity in the governance system was further protected by an 
independent Auditor General. The Auditor General ensures that all public funds are 
accounted for and that it is used in the public good. There is also an Internal Audit 
Unit in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning that further counters any 
financial wrongdoings (Molutsi & Sebudubudu, 2008:56). From early on in 
Botswana’s development use was made of careful planning. Funds were established to 
                                                 
13
 Africanisation is a term used to describe the process of “making” post-colonial African bureaucracies 
and systems more African. This was a system with two goals; one, remove all expatriates (Europeans) 
out of positions of power; and two, to fill all positions with local inhabitants, thus black Africans. 
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create stabilisation reserves and to service public-debt, thereby keeping it low (Good, 
2004:500).  
 
The government created the House of Chiefs in the 1960’s, but gave it no real power. 
Instead chiefs were given positions in government that allowed them to allocate 
resources. However, unlike many other African countries this did not turn into a 
corrupt practice. Chiefs in Tswana culture had always been the allocators of resources 
and thus this did not represent a break from the past. It was a position they were used 
to and not likely to misuse (Robinson, 2009:10). It also provided the government with 
much legitimacy. The BDP successfully managed the nexus between traditional and 
modern institutions. This relationship between old and new is of great importance 
according to Molutsi and Sebudubudu (2008:49-52). According to them the Mofisa or 
rather the traditional client-patron system created cohesion between pre-colonial and 
post-colonial times. Unlike the patrimonial system that developed in the DRC, the 
patron-client relationship created (in pre-colonial times) a type of welfare system in 
which peasants (clients) could make use of the cattle which were owned by the 
nobility (patrons). The patron was dependent on the client in that it was the client who 
looked after the patron’s cattle and thus determined the wellbeing of the patron’s 
wealth. This created an unequal yet somewhat egalitarian system (Molutsi & 
Sebudubudu, 2008:50). The modern political elite often still strongly rely on their 
clients for political support. This creates political accountability, because the patron 
who gets elected as an Member of Parliament must keep his side of the agreement and 
vote in parliament according to the needs of his clients (constituency) (Molutsi & 
Sebudubudu, 2008:51). 
 
The biggest impact on the country during phase one was however the discovery of 
diamonds. In 1967 geologists from De Beers found a kimberlite pipe at Orapa. For 
Botswana diamonds were its economic saviour, unlike many other African countries. 
Diamonds are one of the most valuable but at the same time easily transportable 
products. For Botswana, a land locked country, it was a stroke of luck to find products 
that were easily transportable by air (Cook & Sarkin, 2010:462). The BDP in 1965 
had promised to nationalise all mineral resources if it was elected. In Tswana culture 
the resources of the land belonged to everyone. The government entered into an 
agreement with De Beers from South Africa who would share mine ownership with 
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the government on a 50/50 basis (Hillbom, 2008:202; Poteete, 2007:550,558). Many 
scholars believe Botswana was saved from corruption related to mineral wealth due to 
the fact that the country did not have a mining company to nationalise after 
independence (Hillbom, 2008:201). Instead the industry in the country was created 
from scratch by De Beers. The Botswana government tried to mine nickel and copper 
on its own from 1968 onwards, but the operation was a disaster from the start, proving 
the importance of the De Beer’s partnership. Others that look at Botswana in a 
negative light claim that the country also suffers from less corruption since the 
effective mining allows for high enough rents to be generated (Jerven, 2010:90-91). 
Whatever the reason might be, Botswana discovered and began to extract vast mineral 
wealth whilst remaining largely uncorrupted. The establishment of Debswana is a 
clear example of a public-private partnership that has generally worked in the interests 
of the state as a whole. 
 
In 1966 Botswana’s economy still relied on agriculture, with this sector comprising 40 
per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However by 1971/72 diamond incomes 
provided the government with 5 per cent of its total revenues. This number would still 
increase sharply but is still significant since the first mine at Orapa had only opened in 
1971 (Jerven, 2010:82; Poteete, 2007:550). With the diamond wealth that slowly 
began to flow in, through the efforts of the Central Selling Organisation (a producer 
market cartel run by De Beers), the government was able to increase foreign exchange 
reserves from nothing in 1966 to US$75 million in 1976 (Jerven, 2010:90; Poteete, 
2007:552). Though this is still a very low number, it was significant for a newly 
independent state to be building up reserves rather than increasing its debt. Between 
1965 and 1973/74 Botswana registered a growth rate of 13 per cent in GDP. And with 
sound policies the natural wealth of the country was almost never wasted. By the early 
1970’s the government had constructed 252 public schools with diamond wealth 
(Poteete, 2007:559). 
 
Even with the new diamond economy being fostered in the 1960’s and 1970’s, cattle 
remained an important part of the Botswana economy. The cattle industry is claimed 
as a part of Botswana’s success. Due to the importance of cattle to the elite, the elite 
always remained tied to the rural areas. When the Botswana Meat Corporation (BMC) 
was founded it did not act as a parasitic rent seeking agency, taxing the rural 
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populations excessively as was often the case in other African countries. Rather, 
possibly even due to elite interests, the BMC was run in a reasonable and economical 
manner (Robinson, 2009:9-10). The old tradition of tribal lands being used by the 
community also remained in the independent Botswana. In 1968 the Tribal Land Act 
was promulgated securing this tradition, but removing the power of dispensation from 
the chiefs to the Land Boards. In 1975 a process of allocation rights transfer was 
completed by the issuing of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy which in effect gave 
government full control over land allocation (Hillbom, 2008:203-204). 
 
By the late 1960’s cattle was however declining in importance economically and a 
drought had reduced the national herd by between 30 and 50 per cent (Samatar, 
1999:63). The international consensus before the diamond windfall had been that 
Botswana would remain dependent on Britain for the foreseeable future. However 
after successfully increasing income by renegotiating the South African Customs 
Union and discovering diamonds, prospects seemed to improve. Nonetheless, other 
states with economic wealth such as Nigeria, Gabon and Venezuela have shown that 
management is important or otherwise natural resources can become ineffective. In 
Botswana strong leadership with a combined consciousness of the importance of 
institution building and sound policies for the developing of a capitalist economy 
came together and led to economic success (Samatar, 1999:65). 
 
The government of Botswana succeeded strategically by retaining any Protectorate 
officers that were willing to stay whilst intensely training Batswana in large numbers 
to take over professional and managerial posts. By using this dual approach the 
government was able to develop its institutional capacity. Unity and legitimacy 
ensured that policy-making processes were managed effectively. Further policy 
making was insulated from society centred groups and bureaucrats of the Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) were kept as politically free agents able 
to make sober budgets, plans and monitoring calls. Thus a system of non-political 
technocrats was put in place (Samatar, 1999:95-96).   
 
With the importance of technocrats, development plans became the driving forces of 
the Botswana economic initiative. A development plan is a set of quantitative 
economic targets to be achieved in a given time frame. Botswana strictly uses plans in 
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economic but also in social development. Plans are used in Botswana because the 
government stated in 1970, that the resources available are “few compared to the 
problems”, only very careful planning can be successful (Acquah, 2005:29). National 
Development Plans allow effective use of resources with priority policies, 
programmes and projects. It allows for the creation targets which can be evaluated 
objectively. Government with its development plans allows space for private sector 
and does not push them out. Planning responds adequately to majority’s needs 
(Acquah, 2005:33). With development plans, outcomes are based on the reality of 
available resources, time and capacity. Use is made of consultations with 
stakeholders, ensured coordinated implementation of various policies, creating 
favourable conditions for expansion, diversification, dispersion of productive 
activities of private sector, identifying windows of opportunity and allowing 
adaptability to the unexpected. National Development Plans ensure that development 
is consistent with long term objectives, and it provides adequate opportunity of self-
evaluation to allow rapid implementation of new or improved policies where failure is 
found (Acquah, 2005:34). Planning in Botswana is seen as important by the 
government as they believe it allows the best use of the country’s resources for the 
benefit of the majority of Batswana.  
 
The policies of the Botswana government seem to have worked; GDP between 1965 
and 1969 increased by 10 per cent. Between 1969 and 1974 GDP increased by 22 per 
cent (Acquah, 2005:31). The economic growth, according to Samatar (1999:3), 
created widespread multi sectoral employment. Norms of good political and economic 
governance were also established in this era (Narayanaet al, 2005:19).  
 
Chazan-framework Summary: If one compares Botswana to the Chazan-framework in 
phase one, the dissimilarities are very clear. Botswana after independence did not 
experience the traditional concentration of power. The state did indeed expand and 
take over roles such as land allocation, but it did this in an inclusive process, always 
leaving democratic expression open through free and fair elections in 1965, 1969 and 
1974 (Mfundisi, 2005:165). The election of 1969 was called a year earlier than 
needed, as president Seretse Khama wanted to ensure he had legitimacy after his 
government was accused of all the ills in Botswana at the time. His government won 
the election but his vice president and minister of development were defeated by a 
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former chief. Instead of outlawing opposition and creating a one party state, the 
government introduced electoral reforms preventing retiring chiefs from immediately 
entering politics and absolving the president from standing for parliamentary 
elections. This allowed Botswana’s democracy to accommodate traditional leaders but 
to also protect the system against their power (Maundeni, 2005:6-7). Thus unlike the 
DRC where the MPR was the constitutionalised sole party of the revolution, the BDP 
acted in accordance with democratic principles. Ethnicity in Botswana did not play a 
large role, since the minorities were too small to make themselves heard. Thus even if 
ethnicity became more important for some, it did not have huge damaging effects on 
the larger political state of Botswana. Throughout phase one, Botswana made use of 
careful planning, management and effective negotiations to secure the wellbeing of 
the Botswana economy, by for example entering into an agreement with De Beers in 
the diamond industry (Good, 2004:500). 
 
Resource wealth was regulated through the bureaucracy, the government and 
importantly an external company. Unlike other states, as described by Chazan et al 
(1999), Botswana did not become patrimonial and corrupt. It instilled professionalism 
and a clear independent technocratic bureaucracy, visibly separate from the 
government. In the sources, there is also no strong reference to any increase in 
military power in Botswana. With clear legitimacy, the government kept control 
through electoral support and had no need for using military or police force. 
 
4.3.1.2 Governance in Phase One 
Voice and Accountability: Citizens, during phase one, were able to democratically 
express their views, as shown by the successful democratic elections of 1969. 
Freedom of association was allowed along with freedom of expression. Where there 
were problems these were dealt with through consultation and democratic process as 
shown in constitutional process followed after the 1969 election crisis. 
 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence: There seems to have been little to no 
chance of violent power transfers during phase one. There were no dangerous 
attempts at unconstitutional or destabilising actions against the government either. 
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Government Effectiveness: civil service was clearly independent from the government 
and political pressure. Policy formation was drafted and implemented with vigour by 
government as seen in the mining negotiations and economic upturn.  
 
Regulatory Quality: Government in Botswana showed itself capable of implementing 
beneficial policies and regulations. In the case of the copper and nickel mining this 
was however less successful. Nonetheless government seems to have continuously 
worked towards creating broadly beneficial policies. It facilitated the creation of the 
Auditor-General and organisations such as the Internal Audit Unit in the Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning. These show a willingness to accept policies and 
regulations that improve regulatory quality from independent or independently 
operating institutions. 
 
Rule of Law: As shown in the case of dealing with land allocation and electoral 
difficulties, the government showed itself to be committed to rule of law. Property 
rights and adherence to the law was carefully maintained by the government. 
 
Control of Corruption/Terrorism: Corruption where found was very low. Government 
did not face a problem of corruption and transparency remained high. 
 
Even though the data does not allow exact ratings, the view that can be derived from it 
is that governance in Botswana in phase one was evidently good (Molutsi & 
Sebudubudu, 2008:56). 
 
4.3.1.3 Development in Phase One  
Political Development 
Political development measures the progress made in increasing the freedoms to make 
economic and social choices (Todaro & Smith, 2009:20-22). Political development 
leads to a higher freedom to choose how progress is to take place and also to higher 
living standards. Political rights in phase one showed positive development. The 
electoral process was adapted within democratic rules and results of elections were 
accepted mostly without objections. Political pluralism was encouraged, and if not 
encouraged it was definitely not frowned upon. Government in phase one functioned 
well. Using open market economic policies, corporate assisted development and 
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National Development Plans that were based on sound ideas of management the 
governance of the country contributed to positive especially economic results. 
Freedom of expression, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights were 
protected through the separating of the government and the bureaucracy, the 
nationalisation of mineral wealth and the continuation of the communal land use 
policies. With both political rights and civil liberties showing positive growth, 
political development in phase one in Botswana can be described as having positive 
political development. 
 
Economic Development 
Economic development for Botswana in phase one was clearly positive. GDP in 1969 
increased by 10 per cent and between 1969 and 1974 GDP increased by 22 per cent 
(Acquah, 2005:31; Poteete, 2007:559). The 50-50 diamond deal with De Beers, seen 
as one of the most successful of its type in the world also ensured Botswana economic 
stability for the foreseeable future (Hillbom, 2008:202; Poteete, 2007:550,558). These 
figures clearly indicate the positive trends in economic development. 
 
Social Development 
During phase one Botswana saw a sharp increase in the numbers of Batswana who 
attended school. During phase one the road system was enlarged and the 12 
kilometres of tarred roads would grow to more than 1000 kilometres in 1976. By 1976 
the country would also have a completed telephone network (started in phase one), as 
well as the foundations of a widespread power grid. With an improvement in 
Botswana’s economy the country would also see a decrease in the migrant labour 
system to South Africa. Unlike other systems as described in the Chazan-framework 
in phase one, Botswana did not see a collapse of infrastructure. Instead it built 
infrastructure and improved the plight of its citizens. 
 
4.3.2.1 Phase Two, 1975-1989 
During phase two, the state in Botswana did see an elaboration of power. But unlike 
as described in the Chazan-framework, this elaboration does not refer to any form of 
increasing autocracy; rather it is the settling of normality. In the years between 1975 
and 1989, Botswana matured, with high investment in human resources and 
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infrastructure development alongside macroeconomic stability economic returns 
(Leith, 2005:103). 
 
During phase two Botswana continued to experience democratic participation by its 
population. In some ways the trends in voting patterns do however show that the 
population became accustomed to seeing the same government in place between 1966 
and 1979, and we begin to see the consolidation of a dominant party system. From 
1974 to 1989, eligible voter numbers increased from roughly 310 000 to 510 000. The 
actual numbers registered increased from roughly 240 000 in 1974 to 380 000 in 
1989. However, there was a slight drop in the percentage of voters registered, from 
77.4 per cent in 1974 to 74.5 per cent in 1989 (Mfundisi, 2005:165). Nonetheless the 
numbers remain high enough to show acceptance of the system by citizens. The 
percentage of voters actually casting their votes was low under Seretse Khama, 
measuring only around 30 per cent voter turnout in 1974. By 1989 voter turnout was 
at 67 per cent. After the death of Seretse Khama in 1980, there seems to be an 
increase in voter turnout. The first election after Khama’s death saw voter turnout at 
the 1984 election at 79 per cent, a 49 per cent increase from 1974. This might be due 
to the fact that many saw Seretse Khama more as their chief than a president. Quett 
Masire took over the presidency after the death of Khama. Masire was Khama’s 
chosen successor (Robinson, 2009:1). During the 1980’s the cattle and chiefly elites 
likewise remained in power. In the year between 1966 and 1978, 57 per cent of 
Members of Parliament were also large scale cattle farmers (Poteete, 2007:557). The 
important trend to notice though is the clear continuation of democracy and an 
increase in voter turnout, also the visible continuation of Tswana tradition (Mfundisi, 
2005:165). Participatory democracy which is traditionally strong in Botswana and in 
Tswana culture was thus continued through phase two (Narayana, 2005:21).  
 
During phase two Botswana continued its road to economic self-governance. In 1976 
the Pula was introduced in Botswana. This was the first local currency. Up until this 
time Botswana had been using the South African Rand. This had created difficulties 
with macro-economic management (Samatar, 1999:64). The Pula became a currency 
in its own right in 1980, no longer being tied to the Rand (Jerven, 2010:92). The 
economy was further bolstered by making use of mineral wealth for the improving of 
the economy. Issues such as the delivery of water, health and education to rural areas 
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were often covered with aid money especially from Scandinavian countries (Samatar, 
1999:74). One very interesting trend is employment of Professional Officers at the 
MFDP. Out of 25 executive and higher employees in the Department of Economic 
Affairs, only 5 were local Batswana by 1978. At the department of Financial Affairs 
out of 19, only 6 were local (Samatar, 1999:74). In 1977, 33 per cent of all senior and 
middle management positions in the public service were still filled with expatriates. 
This is a drop of 44 per cent from 1964, but still high for a country 11 years into 
independence (Seidler, 2010:25). This shows a very strong trend of keeping to only 
appointing those that are best qualified. Botswana “acquired” many skilled expatriates 
by requesting the Peace Corps to send Peace Corps volunteers to Botswana. Once 
there they were used in all positions, even ministerial
14
 (Samatar, 1999:87). 
 
Economically the years between 1974 and 1989 saw Botswana prosper. GDP grew by 
11 per cent annually between 1973/1974 and 1978/1979 (Jerven, 2010:82). Total 
Gross National Product (GNP) in the period 1980 to 1991 for example increased by 
9.3 per cent annually (Samatar, 1999:2). GNP measured between 1980 and 1989 
shows an even higher GNP growth rate at 13 per cent per year (Hillbom, 2008:191). 
In the 1966-1971 era Botswana’s exports as percentage of GDP was 25 per cent, and 
its imports were 57 per cent. After the diamond wealth began to be turned into capital, 
in the era 1972-1976, exports increased to 43 per cent, with imports down a little to 54 
per cent. In the 1982-1986 time period exports increased to 58 per cent, two per cent 
higher than the imports at 56 per cent of GDP (Harvey & Lewis, 1990:39). 90 per cent 
of economic growth in the late 1970’s was as a result of government spending, 
mining, trading and finance. Government also began to rely more heavily on mining, 
with mining bringing in 36 per cent of government revenues in 1979/1980 (Jerven, 
2010:82). 
 
In 1972/1973 Botswana ceased to receive a grant-in-aid from the British government 
as it was no longer needed to balance the budget. In the same year two finance 
institutions were created, the Revenue Stabilisation Fund (RSF), and the Public Debt 
Service Fund (PDSF). Both of these funds were to invest in appropriate domestic 
                                                 
14
 The Peace Corps is an United States government organization that sends students and experts from 
the United States to developing nations (Peace Corps, 2011). In Botswana their expertise was used by 
the Botswana government to assist in the training of local Batswana (Samatar, 1999:87). 
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development ventures. The RSF was seen as a destination for short term surplus 
funds. The PDSF was for payments of foreign loans and domestic repayments. The 
PDSF however became the source of finance for most parastatal enterprises. In 1987 
the RSF and PDSF combined had lend out 499 million Pula, compared to the national 
external debt of the government of 479 million Pula (Harvey & Lewis, 1990:53-54). 
Government also successfully increased foreign exchange reserves. By 1980 
Botswana had US$344million in exchange reserves, up from US$75million in 1976. 
In 1985 the figure increased to US$748million and in 1990 it stood at 
US$3331million, up by roughly 970 per cent in one decade (Poteete, 2007:552).  
 
By 1976 Botswana no longer had the problems associated with a fledgling state. It had 
achieved financial independence, it was on the way to having a full national currency 
and it had a working central bank. Physical and social infrastructure had been built 
throughout the country. The policy of maximising mining and then reinvesting profits 
into infrastructure and social services were also by now paying dividends with 
economic progress. The government spent 40 per cent of GDP on primarily 
infrastructure and human development, a figure comparable to Norway at the same 
time (Hillbom, 2008:207). By this time however it also began to show that the 
inequality of Botswana was not going to just fade away. Employment opportunities 
for example were not being created fast enough for the growing population (Harvey & 
Lewis, 1990:55). This problem was one found across the African continent and in this 
case Botswana was not unique. From the 1980’s onwards it became ever harder to 
create equality by reversing underdevelopment (Samatar, 1999:8). 
 
The Botswana government was nonetheless very precise when dealing with the 
economy and public enterprise; a trend that continued and became institutionalised 
during phase two. Operation in public enterprises was regulated with five main 
‘values’: One, a clear mandate was created for every enterprise, preventing any 
unauthorised actions that could cause corruption or waste; two, management goes to 
qualified individuals with professional freedom, this keeps parastatals economically 
competitive and reduces corruption; three, government focussed on key sectors 
avoiding overstretching itself, this prevents a “bogged-down” bureaucratic system; 
four, public enterprises directed the economy, but on a clear commercial basis; and 
lastly, five, government avoided operating sectors that entrepreneurs could easily 
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manage (except for livestock and some other strategic sectors) (Samatar, 1999:11). 
Sound economic policies such as this allowed the Botswana government to always 
have run a budget surplus except for the 1981/1982 year (Narayanaet al, 2005:21).  
 
Chazan-framework Summary: The State in Botswana did expand during phase two. 
However the expansion was not based on a patrimonial need to create more 
government positions and it expanded together with the encouragement of a market 
economy. In contrast it was created out of need, such as the creation of the RSF and 
PDSF. Government and managerial positions were still continuously staffed only by 
qualified individuals even when this meant that the majority of a department would be 
expatriates. Government effectiveness and economic progress continued during phase 
two in Botswana. Parastatals were managed by non-political educated professionals 
who ensured that companies remained on their targets and keep to their mandates. The 
interests of both the political elite and general population was continually served with 
economic growth and investment in services. State legitimacy remained high even 
though inequality became more visible. Nevertheless, Botswana continued to grow its 
democracy and economy. 
 
4.3.2.2 Governance in Phase Two 
Voice and Accountability: Free and fair elections were still held in phase two. 
Freedom of association and the forming of opposition parties and groups were also 
still allowed. Yet the growing unemployment question, the continuous overlooking of 
minorities and their plight and the lack of choice in president remained a detractor for 
voice and accountability. The fact that the president was not elected directly should 
nonetheless not be overstated as it is a cultural phenomenon to some extent.  
 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence: There was no risk of unconstitutional 
transfers of power in phase two and there were no serious instances of political 
violence. The presidential death and initiation of a new president did not create any 
significant instability. 
 
Government Effectiveness: Government continued to implement sound policies such 
as the PDSF and public services were continuously extended further. The civil service 
remained independent and parastatals also benefited from the government’s and 
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bureaucracy’s professionalism. Both government and its institutions remained 
committed to sound policy implementation.  
 
Regulatory Quality: With government’s clear policy of remaining out of the areas in 
economics where entrepreneurs would fare better, but whilst supporting business 
through infrastructure and loans government created a positive growth environment 
with effectively implemented policies. 
 
Rule of Law: There was clear adherence to law. The government respected the limits 
of its power in terms of the government/state and government/entrepreneur divide.  
 
Control of Corruption/Terrorism: Corruption in Botswana in phase two was 
insignificant and no cases of terrorism occurred. 
 
When considering the six indicators for governance a positive trend is once more 
clearly visible and governance for phase two can be seen to have been good. 
 
4.3.2.3 Development in Phase Two 
Political Development 
The electoral process in phase two remained open, free, fair and democratic. Political 
pluralism was allowed with opposition parties and political participation in the era 
increasing, showing political development. However the fact that the opposition 
remained insignificant in phase two could show some lack of democratic values such 
as competition within homogenous groups, or suppression of minorities. Botswana in 
phase two had freedom of expression and belief. People were free to organise into 
groups. Individual and personal autonomy was respected in terms of what the majority 
decided in elections. Again however the minority was not visible. Nonetheless, with 
both political rights and civil liberties showing increased growth, political 
development in this era remained positive, even if it is not very competitive or 
inclusive. Yet we are beginning to see the impact of a dominant party system. 
 
Economic Development 
The Botswana economy in phase two experienced positive economic development. 
GDP and GNP each grew by roughly 10 per cent per annum for the decade between 
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1980 and 1990. There were some signs of economic problems such as unemployment 
and inequality that were emerging but these were not large enough to influence the 
strong economic growth figures. 
 
Social Development 
Social development in phase two increased and definitely saw positive growth with 
enormous percentages of GDP being invested in services and human capital. 
Education, healthcare and other services provided by government benefited from 
government spending, speeding up social development. 
 
4.3.3.1 Phase Three, 1989- 
Botswana in phase three seems to have continued the stable democratic political 
system also seen in phase one and two. Some scholars believe that the succession 
rules of the modern Botswana resemble that of the traditional Tswana culture. In 
Tswana culture there is a saying, kgosi ke kgosi katswetswe, a chief is a chief by right 
of birth (Maundeni, 2005b:81). Chiefs were never elected and in modern Botswana 
this tradition is seen as acceptable when applied to politics when looked at voter 
apathy. Voters do not mind that they do not elect the president directly. In Botswana 
today the hereditary royal family line has been replaced by the elected representatives 
in the parliament. However the only competition takes place amongst the elected 
representatives without the need for voter consent (Maundeni, 2005b:85). In actual 
fact MPs also do not elect a president, they sign a document before elections (and thus 
before they are in power) stating that they vote for the party’s choice of president. 
This means that the president of the party with the most electoral votes automatically 
becomes president. The president also never stands for election in any constituency, 
preliminary or presidential race; rather he inherits the gains of the winning party. Thus 
in this fashion, President Festus Mogae who took over from Masire never stood for 
constituency elections (Maundeni, 2005b:85-86).  
 
Masire, by a set of constitutional provisions implemented in 1998, was empowered to 
select his own vice president who would automatically succeed him if he retired. Thus 
when Masire retired in 1998, Mogae automatically became president (Maundeni, 
2005:86-87). Botswana as a result had a less democratic system without direct 
presidential elections but democracy continued to operate without real disturbance. 
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The economy of Botswana in phase three showed continued growth and success. By 
1996 GNP per capita was at US$1,800, this was up from roughly US$80 in 1966. By 
2006 GNP per capita would have increased to US$5,900, making Botswana an upper-
middle income country (Hillbom, 2008:192). The economy also supported 224 000 
jobs by 1992, up from only 25000 in 1973 (Samatar, 1999:3). Agriculture as a 
percentage of GDP, had dropped from 40 per cent in 1966 to only 5 per cent in 1993 
(Jerven, 2010:90). This shows that the economy was maturing. In the total expanse of 
independence, Botswana maintained a GDP increase of 7 per cent per year (Leith, 
2005:4). Inflation had never been a problem in Botswana, but in the 1990’s inflation 
was further reduced; after a peak at above 15 per cent in 1992, inflation was reduced 
to around 8 per cent between 1997 and 1999 (Leith, 2005:105). This showed the 
ability of Botswana to effectively implement macro-economic policy; stabilising and 
reducing inflation to acceptable levels. In the decade leading up to 1992, Botswana 
had a growth rate of 8.4 per cent, which was the highest in the world for a developing 
country (Good, 2004:499). Foreign reserves were also enlarged during the 1990’s. 
The US$3331million reserves in 1990 were increased to US$4695million by 1995 and 
to US$6317million in 2000. This shows sound economic management (Poteete, 
2007:552) 
 
Education in Botswana showed clear progress in phase three. Primary school 
enrolment by 1994 was at 301,370 (up from 62,833 in 1966), secondary school 
enrolment was at 99,560 (up from 1036 in 1966) and university enrolment was at 
4533 (in 1966 Botswana only had 22 university graduates) (Samatar, 1999:3). By 
2008, in time a bit beyond the scope of this research, literacy in Botswana was at 81 
per cent and 5 per cent of the population had tertiary educations. This shows that 
Botswana through phase one, two and continuing in phase three was making a large 
improvement in the education of the Batswana population (Hillbom, 2008:207).  
 
By the 1990s even though there were a few more cases of corruption Botswana was 
still able to keep corruption in general very low, being one of the world’s 35 least 
corrupt countries. In 1994 the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime 
(DCEC) was formed. Since their creation they have mainly dealt with petty corruption 
cases. Their work has led to the conviction and jailing of a former General Manager 
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of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Fund (MVIF), a former Director of Roads and a former 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Lands. Botswana has a zero tolerance policy on 
corruption as it is seen as a counter to development (Malutsi & Sebudubudu, 2008:57). 
Disciplined and legitimate political leadership of the dominant class led to the 
developing of capacity in ensuring public resources and power was never (or as little 
as possible) used for personal gain. Disciplined and purposive state guidance of the 
economy led to sustained growth. Botswana had managed external influences such as 
De Beers superbly to generate maximised gains (Naranya, 2005:21; Samatar, 
1999:12). In the field of medicine Botswana increased the number of doctors per 
100,000 from 15 in 1980 to 30.2 in 2000, a doubling in the figure (Poteete, 2007:560). 
Education, investment and sound policy was generating positive results.   
 
4.3.3.1.1 The Critics 
Botswana by the late 1990’s was in general benefiting from norms of good political 
and economic governance that had been established at independence (Narayana, 
2005:19). There were nonetheless clear problems; high inequality, high 
unemployment, over reliance on non-renewables and very high HIV/Aids numbers. 
These showed that Botswana still had room for improvement (Narayana, 2005:22). 
Botswana had also failed to address problems arising with representation for the local 
San people, showing that its democracy was at times unresponsive to minorities and 
their needs (Hillbom, 2009:193). A strong reliance on consensus building in Botswana 
governance allows the homogenous Tswana majority to create unchallenged traditions 
(of the majority) (Jerven, 2010:89).  
 
Over reliance on diamonds as a non-renewable resource is also clear when looking at 
1993 figures, by 2003 diamonds represented 70 per cent of exports, 50 per cent of 
government revenues and a total of 30 per cent of GDP, making Botswana over reliant 
on diamonds (Hillbom, 2008:202). Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedi (2006) wrote an 
article in which they summarise Botswana’s negative aspects. According to them, 
even though poverty dropped from 59 per cent in 1986 to 30 per cent in 2003 (down 
from 36 per cent in 2001), the poverty rate remains too high for a country as rich in 
diamonds as Botswana. They claim that if one looks at these figures and also at the 
rising unemployment which was at 24 per cent by 2003, then it is possible to assume 
that the government is not responsive enough to the needs of the majority. This in turn 
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shows that the lack of parliamentary opposition cannot solely be based on general 
happiness in the population but is possibly pointing to a lack of democratic 
governance and real democratic values in society in general (Sebudubudu & Osei-
Hwedi, 2006: 50). Even though one cannot claim that Botswana is completely lacking 
in democratic governance, Sebudubudu & Osei-Hwedi, make a valid observation. 
Botswana is a good example in Africa, but it should not be exaggerated. 
 
The diamond wealth in Botswana has also been in a negative light internationally in 
recent years. The Botswana government was accused of removing San people, 
indigenous to Botswana, out of certain areas so that these areas could be exploited for 
economic gains. This has led to some people claiming that Botswana’s diamonds are 
in a sense conflict diamonds and should be boycotted. The Botswana government said 
that people who complained about the San’s removal were racist and that these people 
only wanted the San to remain “where they are to chase wild life and wear hides”. The 
Botswana opposition parties joined the fray and made even wilder anti-western 
remarks. The poor treatment of the San and the spectacle created by the government 
afterwards in using terms such as “racist whites” have reflected very poorly on the 
Botswana government (Taylor & Mokhawa, 2003:280-281).  
 
Good (2004) further sketches a dark picture of Botswana. According to his article the 
high reputation of good government in Botswana has been crumbling since 1991 with 
the revealing of corruption in the government in organisations such as the National 
Development Bank and the Botswana Housing Corporation. Good argues that these 
are not necessarily new issues and that they developed over time but were not 
investigated due to lack of full transparency in the past (Good, 2004:500-501). He 
continues to list a range of cases of corruption, some by top officials. Elite 
predominance in the system is thought to be one of the main problems leading to 
corruption. Even though corruption has clearly not spread too greatly in Botswana, it 
is evident that corruption is a higher risk during phase three (and in the present) than 
in the past. The professionalism and discipline of the financial and bureaucratic 
system needs to be re-established if Botswana is to keep its good name (Good, 
2004:521). 
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Elite politics in Botswana is also strongly felt in the powerful post of president. 
Presidents in Botswana have not been directly elected since the constitutional change 
in October 1972 which cancelled constituency elections for the president. It is claimed 
this was due to Seretse Khama’s personal dislike of constituency politics. And it was 
indeed a step in the direction of autocracy (Good & Taylor, 2006:53). The elite in 
Botswana (in the BDP) also do not always submit to the law. It was Seretse Khama 
who banned chiefs from standing for public election for five years after retirement 
(due to his vice-president’s inability to win in his constituency), however when Ian 
Khama became vice-president, he remained the Paramount Chief of the Bamangwato. 
In this case the constitution was ignored (Good & Taylor, 2006:53). In other cases of 
undemocratic behaviour, a special provision for the nomination of four ‘specially 
elected’ MPs, designed to include weak communities into decision making, has been 
blatantly misused by the BDP to get BDP members back into parliament who have 
been rejected by their constituencies. These un-elected members (who lost their 
elections) have even been included into cabinet (Good & Taylor, 2006:54). These 
cases show that Botswana might not be openly corrupt, but that the elite are guilty of 
undemocratic actions. 
 
Chazan-framework Summary: By phase three, Botswana had had no coups, no threats 
of secession and low corrupt leadership, compared to the DRC which by the 1990’s 
was already failing, with a corrupt state, and corrupt and ineffective bureaucratic 
structures (Nest, Grignon & Kisangani, 2006:18-24; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:196-198; 
Robinson, 2009:1). With elections continuing and no large cases of political unrest to 
be seen, the government of Botswana seems to have retained the trust of the majority 
of the population. Government did not partake in excessive expansion and budgetary 
expenses were based on sound financial decisions. Public offices were also clearly 
still seen as legitimate with no wide opposition being raised with the making of the 
president into an even less public responsive position. The Botswana economy in 
phase three was not dwindling and budgetary surpluses could be retained. In contrast, 
the DRC in phase three, as shown in chapter 3, was suffering from a collapsing 
economy and by 1994 the formal economy had all but ceased to exist. The DRC state 
also had to use what little power it had left to supress the population and opposition 
with military force. In Botswana there was no comparable violent opposition, and no 
state wide spread violence needed to be used by the elite to keep control of the 
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democratic state. The state in Botswana faced real challenges such as minority 
discrimination and high levels of HIV/Aids, but it remained stable (Nest, Grignon & 
Kisangani, 2006:18-24; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:196-198; Robinson, 2009:1). 
 
4.3.3.2 Governance in Phase Three 
The WGI rates the six governance indicators on a score between -2.5 and +2.5. A 
score of -2.5 is very poor governance and a score of +2.5 is very good governance 
(World Bank Group, 2011). The figures for the DRC for the same period is listed in 
brackets after each score received by Botswana. The six indicators for 1996 for 
Botswana rate as follows: 
 
Voice and Accountability   : 0.81 (-1.63) 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence : 0.74 (-1.87) 
Government Effectiveness   : 0.26 (-1.54) 
Regulatory Quality    : 0.86 (-2.33) 
Rule of Law     : 0.61 (-2.31) 
Control of Corruption/Terrorism  : 0.52 (-2.49) 
 
These figures show that Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption/Terrorism are 
all rated as good. Government Effectiveness is also rated as good, but to a lesser 
extent. However, the WGI also provide a percentage indicating the standing of the 
country compared to others for each rating. If the percentage is zero, the country is the 
worst in the world (or equally terrible as others that are rated the worst with it 
internationally). If the percentage is 100, the country is the best in the world for that 
indicator. In this rating Government Effectiveness along with Rule of Law are the 
lowest ratings for Botswana, with 62.1 and 67.6 respectively. This figure is 
nonetheless high enough to still be seen as some of the better examples in the world. 
For this reason a lower WGI Government Effectiveness rating does not diminish the 
fact that Botswana can be classified as having had good governance in phase three. 
When one compares the figures for Botswana and the DRC the contrast is staggering. 
Where Botswana scored lowest in Government effectiveness at 62.1, the DRC’s 
highest score was for Voice and Accountability at 6.2, a very low number indicating a 
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very poor rating. For interest sake, the DRC scored a zero for Rule of Law, indicating 
it was the worst in the world in that category for 1996 (World Bank Group, 2011). 
 
4.3.3.3 Development in Phase Three 
Political Development 
The Freedom House, Freedom in the World survey, rate countries based on political 
right and civil liberties. Each country is then assigned a score based on certain 
indicators for the variables. Countries with scores of between 1.0 and 2.5 are rated as 
“Free”, between 3.0 and 5.0 as “Partly Free” and those between 5.5 and 7.0 as “Not 
Free”. Based on the data thus far presented this research would rate Botswana in 
phase three as free, with positive political development. Freedom house rates 
Botswana in 2002 as “Free”, with Political Rights and Civil liberties receiving a rating 
of 2. This rating supports the trajectory tracked by the research in Botswana up to this 
time (Freedom House, 2002a). The DRC in contrast was rated as “Not Free” in 2001 
with Political Rights receiving a 7 and with Civil liberties being rated as 6 (Freedom 
House, 2002b). 
 
Economic Development 
In phase three the economy was growing with year on year increases in GDP. GNP 
was also rising throughout the 1990’s. Jobs were being created and macro-economic 
management such as inflation control was used effectively. With sound management 
and increases in the value of the economy, Economic Development in phase three is 
rated as positive. The Gross Domestic Product of the DRC (then Zaire) in contrast 
declined by 7.2 per cent in 1991, 12,3 per cent in 1992 and 10,4 per cent in 1993. 
Inflation for this period also exceeded 20 000 per cent in the DRC (Clark, 1998:112). 
 
Social Development 
Social development for this era was positive. The Human Development Index (HDI) 
rating, that measures both economic and social development, but with a focus on 
individuals rose throughout the 1990’s. The fact that the HDI focuses on individuals 
allows us to see social development by looking at the single units that make up a 
society, the individuals. The HDI rates countries and then assigns a number between 1 
and zero. Zero is the lowest and represents very low social development, with 1 being 
the highest showing strong social (human) development. In 1990 Botswana received a 
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rating of 0.576. This rating is higher than the world average of 0.526 at the same time, 
and much higher than the African average of 0.354 for 1990 (UNDP, 2011a). 
Between 1990 and 2000 the HDI for the DRC fell from 0.261 to 0.201, much lower 
than Botswana’s rating and also below the African average (UNDP, 2011b). By 2000, 
the HDI rating for Botswana measured higher than in 1990 at 0.572. The world 
average at this time was 0.57. Thus Botswana showed a positive social development 
trend, even though the rest of the world was now much closer to the Botswana figure. 
This might show a case of progress, but slowed down progress, which could actually 
be an indication of a negative movement taking effect. However, in the African 
context Botswana figures are very high. African countries in 2000 were given an 
average HDI rating of 0.315, 0.039 lower than in 1990 (UNDP, 2011a). Thus 
Botswana in the 1990’s was in a general area of lowering HDI, whilst it continued to 
have a positive HDI. This indicates, as argued by the research, positive social 
development in Botswana during phase three. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Botswana can be seen as a success in state development; this becomes very evident 
when compared to the DRC. Botswana does have its negatives and these should not 
be underestimated. Unresponsiveness to minorities may indicate a lack of true 
democratisation in a mostly homogenous society. There is also a threat of the 
executive being out of touch with the citizens in the country since they are not directly 
elected and have their own interests due to the elite class they belong to. However 
Botswana has shown that its leadership is willing to make the decisions that safeguard 
the general population. Corruption is kept at a low and oversight mechanisms are 
allowed and empowered to operate at maximum efficiency. Organisations such as the 
DCEC contribute to this and they are willing to prosecute or investigate even 
politically connected individuals. The economy of Botswana has mostly seen positive 
growth, democratic free and fair elections are held regularly and the country is 
generally stable. Governance in Botswana has been good in all of the three phases as 
portrayed by the Chazan-framework. Political, economic and social development has 
also been positive for all three the phases.  
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Chapter 5: Research Overview 
 
 
5.1.1 Introduction  
The research presented two cases of state development in Africa. In the following 
chapter an overview of the research will be given, along with a summary of the key 
findings of the comparative analysis of Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC
15
) and Botswana. Both of the cases followed different trajectories of 
development and were governed in very different ways making for an interesting 
comparison. In general the DRC has been shown to have suffered from poor 
governance and slow to negative growth, compared to Botswana which benefited 
from good governance and enjoyed positive economic growth and social 
development. Thus, this study made use of most-dissimilar comparative cases with the 
DRC accounting for poor governance and Botswana accounting for good governance. 
 
It should be stated that this study is aware of the fact that Botswana cannot be seen as 
a perfect example to be followed by all states and that the country does suffer from 
some forms of less effective and at times even corrupt governance. However this does 
not deter from the fact that Botswana, as an African state, does have a relatively good 
record in governance and has experienced positive state development.  
 
5.1.2 Framework, Methodology, Theory and Chapter Overview 
The research question, which guided this study was:  
What is the influence and effect, of state institution formation and policy 
implementation (governance) by governments, on state development in terms of 
economical-, political- and social development?  
The question was answered using a comparative analysis of two case studies: 
Botswana and Zaire/DRC.  
 
5.1.2.1 Theoretical Framework 
The analytical framework used in this study was based on the work of Chazan, Lewis, 
Mortimer, Rothchild and Stedman (1999). In the research this framework is referred 
                                                 
15
 In this chapter the abbreviation DRC refers to all the names of the territory of modern DRC no matter 
the time in question. Thus instead of talking about Zaire in the 1980’s, the DRC was rather used 
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to as the Chazan-framework. The Chazan-framework divides the time after the de-
colonisation of Africa into three periods. Each period has an overarching theme along 
with general occurrences. The Chazan-framework was especially useful for this 
particular study since the two main variables of the study were governance and 
development and the Chazan-framework looks at both governance changes in each 
phase as well as at changes that are development related. This study is also a historic 
overview and the Chazan-framework accommodated this by being retrospective in its 
analysis. We will now briefly review the three phases of the Chazan-framework. 
 
Phase one: The overarching theme for phase one was the seeming predisposition of 
African states to experience a concentration of political power after independence. 
Phase one occurred in the period directly after the gaining of independence by African 
states; mainly in the 1950s and the 1960s. The phases in the Chazan-framework are 
not exclusively set to certain times and some variation does occur. For this reason 
phase one can still continue in the 1970s for example after starting in the 1960s as was 
the case with the DRC. During phase one African governments experienced 
independent rule for the first time after colonialism, or for the first time in history in 
the case of newly formed states (thus areas that were not collectively governed before 
colonialism).  
 
Apart from centralisation, the first indications of partimonialism emerged during 
phase one. This process ultimately distances the government (and the state) from the 
citizenry. Thus it was a time that saw the beginning of poor governance and also the 
beginning of economic and developmental exclusion of the majority of African 
populations. 
 
Phase two: The main characteristic or overarching theme for phase two is the 
elaboration of state power. Phase two falls into the time period of the 1960s and 
1970s, and sometimes into the 1980s. Phase two saw the African state overextend 
itself and in doing so begin to lose its effectiveness. The African bureaucracy grew 
rapidly during these decades. During the 1960s it grew at an average of 7 per cent per 
year. By the 1970s, approximately 60 per cent of all wage earners were state 
employees and in the 1980s, 50 per cent of state expenditure went to salaries for state 
employees (Chazan et al, 1999:55). This system created a state in which a new 
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empowered class, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, emerged dominant. These people 
were in charge of the state and had very different needs than the people in whose 
name they were supposed to govern. Thus this phase saw poor governance and further 
decline in development for the majority of the population. 
 
Phase three: The third phase is known for the reconsideration of state power 
according to the Chazan-framework. This reconsideration was not necessarily due to a 
democratic turn of heart by the elite but due to signs of state failure and state collapse. 
Reforms were largely attempts by the elite to remain in power, not to truly begin 
sharing power. Phase three took place during the 1970s and 1980s and in other areas 
during the 1980s and 1990s. By phase three the government had lost the trust of the 
population and thus legitimacy. Its structures were overstaffed and very cost intensive. 
By over consuming on taxes in salaries the capacity of the government and state was 
further reduced and the state became almost redundant. By phase three the state was 
in real danger of collapse, as happened in the case of the DRC. 
 
5.1.2.2 Key concepts 
The two main variables used in this research were governance and development. 
Governance being the independent variable and development the dependent variable. 
The research assumed that the state was still in pre-eminence in the current world. 
Based on this assumption the research used the two most-dissimilar case studies and 
followed their trajectories in governance and in development through the three phases 
of the Chazan-framework.  
Good governance in the research was defined as: 
 a governance style that promotes the creation of strong, open, equal and free 
political and economic institutions. It supports the maintenance of checks and 
balances on power, it is anti-corruption geared and improves and maintains the 
delivery of services normally associated with state governments (Ikome, 2007:147-
148).    
Governance was measured using the World Bank’s indicators of governance. 
 
This study further defined development as: 
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 the political, economic and social progress made in a state by increasing the 
delivery of public goods and services, increasing life expectancy and by increasing the 
economic and political choice of its citizens and inhabitants.  
Development was measured in terms of political, economic and social 
development. Phase one and two were mostly qualitatively analysed based on the 
extensive use of literary sources, whilst phase three was rated by Freedom House for 
political development, economic development was rated by analysing economic data 
such as unemployment, Gross Domestic Product, debt and trade figures and social 
development was measured by making use of the ratings provided by Human 
Development Index. We now turn to the findings of the research. 
 
5.2 Analysis of Research 
This section will provide a summary of the comparison of the DRC, and Botswana. 
The results of the study for the DRC and Botswana are visually represented in two 
tables (table 5.1 and table 5.2) at the beginning of each section on each of the case 
studies respectively. The top row indicates what each column is measuring, starting 
from left to right with: first, phases of the Chazan-framework; second, governance, 
measured as poor or good; third, political development, measured as positive, 
negative or neutral (this remains the same for all development measurements); four, 
economic development; five, social development; and six, the Chazan-framework, 
this is rated as to be similar to the Chazan framework with a “Yes” and dissimilar 
with a “No”. 
 
5.2.1 The Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
Phases Governance Political Economic Social Chazan 
Phase 1 Poor Neutral Negative Negative Yes 
Phase 2 Poor Negative Negative Negative Yes 
Phase 3 Poor Negative Negative Negative Yes 
Table 1 Summary of the DRC 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo was selected as a case in the comparative 
study as it was expected that it would be a good example of a state that followed a 
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trajectory which led to state failure. Once the DRC had been analysed it became clear 
that this presumption was justified. The DRC provides this study with a case that can 
be seen as something close to being a worst case scenario. The case study clearly 
showed the appropriateness and accuracy of the Chazan-framework illustrating an 
example of a state descending into a spiral of poor governance and negative economic 
growth after decolonisation. Looking at table 5.1 we note that the DRC received a 
“Yes” in the Chazan column in all three phases, thus it followed the trajectory 
described by the Chazan-framework almost exactly . 
 
5.2.2 Botswana 
 
Phases Governance Political Economic Social Chazan 
Phase 1 Good Positive Positive Positive No 
Phase 2 Good Positive Positive Positive No 
Phase 3 Good Positive Positive Positive No 
Table 2 Summary of Botswana 
 
Botswana was selected as a case as it differed significantly from the DRC. Where the 
DRC was considered to be partly free, Botswana is hailed as a liberal democracy by 
Freedom House. Where the DRC experienced economic stagnation and decline, 
Botswana experienced development and modernisation. If one looks at the result in 
the Chazan column Botswana never fitted into the Chazan-framework and is always 
rated as “No”.  
 
The results for Botswana are in complete contrast to that of the DRC in almost every 
category. In all phases Botswana experienced good governance and in all phases the 
DRC experienced poor governance. Except for neutral political development in phase 
one, the DRC also contrasts with Botswana by experiencing negative development in 
all development categories over all three phases, compared to Botswana’s results 
which show positive development in all phases in all categories. The results of the 
study show that in the case of the DRC, where governance was poor, development 
would most likely also be poor. In the case of Botswana we find that positive 
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development and good governance were also coexistent. We will now compare how 
different trajectories of development played out in the two case studies.  
 
5.2.3 Comparison of Case studies 
During phase one, immediately after independence Botswana began a process in 
which it tried to instil professionalism in its bureaucracy. It allowed expatriates to 
remain in the country and as civil servants, since Botswana saw these individuals as 
crucial in transferring knowledge to local Batswana. In complete contrast, the DRC 
after independence began a process of Africanisation. In this process, the bureaucracy 
was emptied of foreign civil servants and all positions were filled by local Africans, 
skilled or not. This seems to indicate two very dissimilar governance styles. The 
reasons for the differences are not evident and a range of possible reasons can be 
surmised. The DRC and Botswana have, for example, two very different experiences 
of colonialism; where Botswana was mostly left untouched by the British, the DRC 
was submitted to human rights abuses and other crimes by the Belgian colonisers, 
possibly leading to a wish to be rid of them. The DRC also did not share a pre- to 
post-colonial social link as was the case of elites and peasants in Botswana. Botswana 
was thus able to manage the nexus between traditional and modern systems of 
governance very well. In contrast the main aim of the government in the DRC was to 
gain maximum direct control over its territory.  
 
The traditional relationships in Botswana continued and a symbiotic patron client 
relationship developed based on a range of mutual benefits such as land usage, 
electoral support, cattle, and implementation of laws. Classes in society could be seen 
to do what is good for other classes as this then indirectly or even directly led to 
personal gains, almost like a political “invisible hand”. As with Adam Smith’s 
example, the baker does not bake bread because he likes baking bread, but because he 
gets money for doing so. Politicians in Botswana who wanted power needed the 
support of the electorate, possibly stimulating the implementation of policies in some 
areas as a means to satisfy populations, thus increasing electoral support, and ability 
to wield power. The elite also needed to look after the interest of the peasants, since 
the elite were still attached to the land through their cattle, but dependent on the 
peasants to care for the cattle. The elites’ wealth was in the hands of the peasants. 
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In the DRC a completely different system emerged. After independence, the new 
government of Mobutu sought to gain complete control of the DRC territory. He did 
this through centralising power as well as through more devious means such as the 
public executions of rivals, constitutional changes banning opposition forces and the 
destruction of local authorities, the nationalisation of foreign investment and even 
through military attack where deemed necessary. These actions led to a system that 
did not have many roots in traditional power systems from the pre-colonial Congo. It 
also led to the loss of professionalism and expertise, since the people who at the time 
knew how to manage the DRC bureaucracy were removed. The DRC went through a 
process of impedance, during which the state turned the raising of opposition voices 
into acts of treason. The creation of opposition groups was limited and what could be 
said in opposition was restricted. Accordingly the DRC also followed the process of 
facilitation during which the Mobutu regime took control of the administration by 
centralising authority and employing loyal party members in most state positions. Due 
to limited delivery and a decline in legitimacy, the regime also increased the coercive 
apparatus such as the police and military strength. 
 
The choices made by Botswana and the DRC after independence placed them on 
development trajectories that were in almost full contrast. Botswana for example 
began to build up foreign reserves, whilst the DRC began to build its system of 
patrimonialism which in time would lead to the exploitation of the population. 
Mobutu created a patrimonial system with himself at the apex of it. He enlarged the 
bureaucracy so that he could allow loyal allies and “subjects” to share in the benefits 
of the state. Officials were given the power to exploit the population as rewards for 
loyalty to Mobutu. Where Mobutu in the early 1970s allowed state control of 
parastatals with politically appointed managers, Botswana was in a public-private 
partnership with De Beers. Where Botswana experienced a continuous change in 
leadership, in terms of the president and cabinet, the DRC was ruled as a personal 
fiefdom of Mobuto. The system in the DRC led to corruption, economic stagnation 
and increased international debt. In Botswana foreign reserves were ever increasing 
and corruption was kept at a minimum.  
 
In Botswana strong and responsible leadership, the acceptance of institution building, 
empowering these institutions with sound policies and keeping them non-political 
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with a clear separation between state and government in a capitalist economy led to 
development. In the DRC oppressive leadership based on personal gain led to an 
increase in violence and the size of the military. Where Botswana had a weak military 
and an improving democracy, the DRC had a relatively strong military but no real 
democracy. In the DRC this began to cause an increase in government insecurity and 
an inability to follow coherent policies as seen in first the implementation and then the 
cancelation of Radicalisation. 
 
During phase two the state in the DRC increased in size due to pressure on the 
executive. The government needed to continuously act as the facilitator for 
patrimonialism and the maintenance of control through this network by Mobutu. Thus 
the government grew due to increased corruption. In Botswana the government was 
also growing, but this was due to the need for more institutions that could oversee the 
growing economy. These institutions were created and run in a professional and non-
political manner. Both cases experienced government and state growth but due to 
completely different reasons. One key difference in the two systems was the 
alienating of the general population of the DRC by the Mobutu regime. Botswana, 
intended or unintended, was experiencing progress benefiting both the elite and the 
general population, however in the DRC a parasitic bureaucracy and president was in 
control of the state. 
 
By the 1990’s (phase three) the development trajectory of the DRC had led it to the 
point of collapse. The state was corrupt, bankrupt and failing. It was threatened by 
possible coups, and politicians, as described by the Chazan-framework, were trying to 
renegotiate the government, but unwilling to cede power. In Botswana the state was 
not at risk. There were no threats of violent takeovers and the state still maintained its 
legitimacy. Botswana was still spending its income on clearly budgeted programs. 
The DRC in contrast lacked the funds for even the most basic public services. 
 
At the time where this research ends, the DRC’s trajectory during all three phases is 
characterised by poor governance and overwhelmingly negative development. This all 
culminates in state collapse, civil war, local uprisings, foreign invasion and a 
complete loss of state legitimacy by the late 1990’s. In comparison, Botswana is 
characterised by positive development and good governance for all three phases. By 
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the 1990’s some new problems emerged for Botswana, such as HIV-Aids and 
corruption. The Botswana state’s reaction to Aids, empowered through economic 
prosperity, is however strong and the disease does not pose a threat to its stability 
during the scope of the current research. And even though corruption begins to 
become visible, it does not threaten the survival of the Botswana state, which reacts to 
this threat by creating non-political institutions for overseeing government. Botswana 
by the late 1990’s is wealthier than it was at the beginning of the 1960’s, it is largely 
democratic (despite having a dominant party system), it is stable and free of violence. 
It seems possible that good governance worked for Botswana and that poor 
governance ruined the DRC. 
 
5.3 Significance 
This study’s significance is fairly broad as the results can be applied to a wide range 
of areas of study. This research has contributed to the debate on the importance of the 
state. Government choices such as how to maintain power, determining who has 
access to power and especially the nature of the expansion of the bureaucracy seems 
to have far reaching influences for African states. States that have short term views 
such as rapid transformation (Africanisation) risk losing expertise, professionalism 
and effectiveness, and in turn, development in the long term.  
 
The study also contributes to the debate on the importance of democracy. A 
democratic form of government, which includes alternative voices in the form of 
allowing the development and participation of opposition parties and civil society 
tends to lead to more legitimacy and less need for the coercive apparatus. Censoring 
criticisms, military expansion and intolerance to opposition forces in time leads a state 
on a trajectory of declining legitimacy. In this study the democratic case study, 
Botswana, developed and was stable, whilst the autocratic state, the DRC, stagnated, 
declined in all areas of development and was unstable. This study also seems to show 
that when a state takes a decision, the importance of this decision will be magnified in 
the future. Botswana implemented a professional and largely apolitical bureaucracy at 
independence; as a result, after diamonds were discovered, the country suffered less 
from corruption, and the benefits of the diamond wealth could be shared by the entire 
population. Botswana’s mineral wealth is a blessing and not a curse, as is the case in 
the DRC, this may be due to the public-private partnership in the form of Debswana, 
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as opposed to complete state control of the mines as occurred in the DRC. Corruption 
increases amongst other factors contributes to the de-legitimisation of the state and its 
ultimate collapse as seen in the DRC.  
 
Botswana in Southern Africa and Africa stands out not because it is a perfect example 
of a flawless state. It stands out because of good governance. If there are lessons for 
sub-Saharan states it seems to be that it is beneficial for a state in the long term to 
follow practices that are anti-corruption, pro-democracy, pro-competition, makes use 
of public-private partnerships, encourage leadership change, implement market-
orientated economic policies and empower government oversight institutions. 
Oppression in time causes the need for more oppression; this leads to further loss of 
legitimacy, loss of economic opportunities and income, and in the end social unrest, 
which causes the cycle to repeat by the application of more stringent oppression. This 
cycle in turn leads a state down a spiral of state collapse during which it loses control 
of the economic and political spheres. States, it appears, would be wise to keep to the 
practice of good governance as this seems to be supportive of long-term development 
and legitimacy. 
 
Some possibilities for future research have also been identified. For one it would be 
significant to investigate the effect or impact of the dominant party system in 
Botswana. Did this system contribute to stability and does or did it play a role in the 
almost universal, but to some extent over exaggerated, positive view of Botswana? 
Recently we have seen the Botswana government impose limitations on public 
protests after recent public service protests. Thus is democracy limited by the 
dominant party system?  
 
The role of public-private partnerships in the development of countries requires 
further research. Botswana has shown that its relationship with De Beers has led to 
economic success with limited corruption. It would be beneficial to further research 
the importance of these public-private partnerships, and look at how they fare 
compared to government operations. A national comparison between projects in 
Botswana could be used in this case. 
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An interesting topic to look at would be the power structures that emerge in collapsed 
or failed states, thus who are in control in what areas and what are the measures used 
to create cohesion and support? One could also look at the role of informal economies 
in African states. Informal economies seem to contribute to the undermining of the 
state and could be important to understand in terms of state collapse. Finally this 
research has also served to highlight the importance of leadership and comparative 
studies of African leaders would be instructive. It would for example be interesting to 
investigate and account for the different leadership styles of Mobuto and Sereste 
Khama. 
 
In conclusion, it seems that there is an important relationship between governance and 
development. In Africa - a continent plagued by poor social, economic and political 
development it is clear that governance matters. 
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